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I. INTRODUCTION
When taxpayers underreport their federal income taxes, they are
subject to a complex set of penalty regimes.1 The type of penalty that
may be imposed depends on factors such as the taxpayer’s state of mind
and efforts to correctly calculate its taxes, the type of issue that results in
an underreporting, the type and level of authority supporting the
taxpayer’s position, and whether the taxpayer disclosed the issue on its
tax return. However, there is a common exception for almost all the
∗ © Partner, Clifford Chance US LLP, Adjunct Professor, New York Law School.
1. I.R.C. § 6663 (2006) (fraud); Id. § 6662(b)(1) (2006) (negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations); Id. § 6662(b)(2) (substantial understatements of federal income tax); Id. § 6662(a)
(understatements with respect to reportable transactions); Id. § 6662(b)(6) (understatements with
respect to transactions lacking economic substance or failing to meet the requirements of any
similar rule of law).
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penalty regimes where the taxpayer shows reasonable cause for its
2
position, and that it acted in good faith in taking the position. In many
cases, a taxpayer can establish reasonable cause and good faith by
showing that the taxpayer reasonably relied in good faith on professional
tax advice.3
The penalty system serves a crucial role in fostering voluntary
compliance with the tax law.4 However, Congress generally has rejected
the automatic imposition of penalties for understatements of tax because
5
of the complexity and uncertainty of many tax rules and principles. A
2. Id. § 6664(c)-(d) (2006). The reasonable cause and good faith exception does not apply to
understatements arising from transactions that lack economic substance or fail to meet the
requirements of any similar rule of law. Also, as discussed below, a modified version of the
reasonable cause and good faith exception applies to understatements arising from so-called
“reportable transactions.”
3. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6664-4(c), 1.6664-4(f)(2) (as amended in 2003). Cf. I.R.C. §
6664(d)(4)(B) (defining circumstances where advice may not be relied upon to establish the
taxpayer’s reasonable belief about a position in a reportable transaction).
4. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO
CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) 31 (Comm. Print 1999) [hereinafter STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS]:
Penalties for the failure to comply with tax laws are a necessary component of any
system of tax laws if broad compliance with the tax laws is to be expected. Penalties for
the failure to comply with laws serve to establish and validate the standards of behavior
set forth by the tax laws themselves, as well as to punish specific departures from such
laws. Furthermore, the application of penalties in specific instances will help to promote
the continued compliance with the tax laws by the currently law-abiding. In the absence
of penalties, the tax laws would, at best, represent a suggested code of behavior. Anyone
who disagreed with such code would be able to violate it without consequence.
COMMISSIONER’S EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE ON CIVIL PENALTIES, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES II-2 (1989) [hereinafter REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES]:
Given the wide-ranging responsibilities of the IRS and the ultimate reliance of our
taxation system on voluntary compliance, penalties have a relatively limited, though
important role. The compliance function of IRS is principally concerned with protecting
and enhancing voluntarily compliant conduct by taxpayers. Penalties constitute one
important tool for IRS to use in pursuing its mission of encouraging voluntary
compliance. In line with IRS’s mission, IRS believes that penalties are positively related
to the accomplishment of IRS’s mission only if they operate to encourage voluntary
compliance, and that penalties can and should be evaluated solely on the basis of
whether they do the best possible job of encouraging compliant conduct.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES:
THE NEED FOR REFORM 2-3 (2009) [hereinafter AICPA REPORT].
5. See generally GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
ACT OF 1982, at 216-17 (Comm. Print 1982) (“Congress recognized that taxpayers and the
Government may reasonably differ over the sometimes complex Federal tax laws, and that a penalty
is not appropriate in many cases in which there is a large underpayment because there was
substantial authority for the taxpayer’s position”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 575 (1982) (Conf.
Rep.):
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regime that penalizes taxpayers that incorrectly claim benefits they
legitimately believe are available risks creating the public perception
6
Thus, the penalties for
that the tax law is arbitrary and unfair.
misreporting tax return information do not penalize the misreporting per
se, but the taxpayer’s failure to adhere to a standard of behavior in
determining and reporting its tax liability.7
[t]he conferees did not adopt an absolute standard that a taxpayer may take a position on
a return only if, in fact, the position reflects the correct treatment of the item because, in
some circumstances, tax advisors may be unable to reach so definitive a conclusion.
Rather, the conferees adopted a more flexible standard under which the courts may
assure that taxpayers who take highly aggressive filing positions are penalized while
those who endeavor in good faith to fairly self-assess are not penalized.
Congress has imposed strict liability penalties for understatements arising from transactions lacking
economic substance or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law, and from
“reportable transactions” that are not disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). I.R.C. §§
6664(c)(6), (d)(2), (d)(3) (2006).
6. See REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 4, at VIII-36:
A strict liability penalty would be simple, easy to comprehend, and easy to administer.
Because of the certainty of its application, such a penalty might be adequately severe
even at lower rates. On the other hand, the penalty would apply regardless of whether
the taxpayer met the proposed standard of behavior. Thus, the penalty would treat
similarly situated taxpayers differently. Given the complexity of the factual situations
involved and the complexity of the tax law, the Task Force believes that the number of
such penalties imposed on compliant taxpayers would be unacceptably high. The Task
Force was concerned that regularly penalizing taxpayers who comply with the standard
would be considered unfair, would destroy the moral and ethical connotations of the
penalty, and would ultimately undermine the standard of behavior. Thus, the Task Force
rejected a strict liability penalty.
See also Clinton Stretch, Matthew Lay & John Galotto, Economic Substance and Strict Liability Do
Not Mix, TAX NOTES 1357 (2009); AMERICAN BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, STATEMENT OF POLICY
FAVORING REFORM OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX PENALTIES 9 (2009) [hereinafter ABA STATEMENT];
AICPA REPORT, supra, note 4, at 9-10.
7. See STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS, supra note 4, at 156:
[t]he accuracy-related and return preparer penalties are designed to delineate (1) whether
an erroneous position should be considered innocent and not subject to penalty, (2) when
taxpayers should specifically notify the IRS that they are adopting controversial
positions, and (3) when taxpayers are taking unduly aggressive positions and should be
penalized for any resulting tax deficiency regardless of disclosure
REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 4, at II-4:
Our general definition of a “penalty” as an adverse consequence imposed for violating a
federal tax rule takes as a starting point a distinction between the consequence i.e., the
penalty) imposed for violating a rule and the rule itself. This distinction between a rule
and the consequence of violating it establishes the fact that penalties operate in the
service of a set of other rules or expectations. The identification of the set of rules
protected by penalties becomes, then, a critical issue, for each penalty should be
evaluated based on its success in protecting or improving compliance with the rule to
which it relates.
See also REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 4, at III-1-III-2 (penalties should set and
validate standards of behavior, deter departures from those standards of behavior, and provide
taxpayers who depart from those standards their just desserts).
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The penalty standard of taxpayer behavior has evolved,8 but the
modern penalty system generally has allowed a taxpayer to avoid
penalties by establishing a bona fide belief that its position had a
minimum likelihood of succeeding if challenged by the IRS and
9
litigated. Because most taxpayers cannot independently determine the
likelihood of success of a complex position, the current penalty system
recognizes that a taxpayer often must rely on professional tax advice to
determine its proper tax liability.10 However, the penalty system also
recognizes that taxpayers should not be able to avoid penalties simply by
obtaining favorable tax advice if that advice does not meet minimum
standards of relevance and reliability, or if the taxpayer’s reliance is not
reasonable and undertaken in good faith.11

8. See Peter A. Prescott, Taxpayer Civil Penalty Protection: Long Term Capital Holdings
and its Wake, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 995, 1010-14, 1026-28 (2008); ABA STATEMENT, supra note 6, at
2-4; REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 4, at VIII-2-VIII-10.
9. I.R.C. § 6664(c)-(d) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (as amended in 2003).
10. See REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 4, at VIII-12 (“[t]he advisory and
executory functions provided by practitioners is important to the preparation of returns in many
situations and must be taken into account in identifying the appropriate standard.”).
11. A number of commentators have discussed the standards that opinions should meet to
permit a taxpayer to avoid penalties. See, e.g., Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance,
46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111 (2009); Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s
Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017 (2009); Henry P. Bubel, Avoiding Penalties with Tax
Opinions After Long Term Capital, 817 PLI/TAX 785 (2008). See generally Prescott, supra note 8.
More generally, many viewpoints have been expressed about the responsibilities of tax advisors in
providing penalty protection opinions. See, e.g., BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN &
KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 101.2 (6th ed. 2006) (The “practitioner’s
obligation to the client, however, is not unrestricted. The practitioner also owes a duty, albeit less
well-defined, to the tax system as a whole.”); Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The
Case for Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583 (2006);
Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer’s Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1027 (1987);
Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA Formal Opinion 85352, 39 TAX LAW 643 (1986); Linda Galler, The Tax Lawyer’s Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX
REV. 681 (1997) (reviewing Bernard Wolfman, James P. Holden & Deborah H. Schenk, Ethical
Problems in Federal Tax Practice (1995)); Myron C. Grauer, What’s Wrong with This Picture?:
The Tension Between Analytical Premises and Appropriate Standards for Tax Practitioners, 20
CAP. U. L. REV. 353 (1991); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Reply, Counseling Ordered Liberty, 9 VA.
TAX REV. 781 (1990); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA.
TAX REV. 77 (1989); James P. Holden, Practitioners’ Standard of Practice and the Taxpayer’s
Reporting Position, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 327 (1991); James P. Holden, Commentary, Constraining
Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA. TAX REV. 771 (1990); David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties
to Clients and Duties to Others–the Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the
Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW 169 (2009); Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Challenging
the Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693 (1997); Deborah
H. Schenk, Tax Ethics, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (1982) (reviewing Bernard Wolfman & James P.
Holden, Ethical Problems in Federal Tax Practice (1981)); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax
Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 468-76, 483-85 (2008); Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers,
Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the System, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847, 909 (1999).
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In determining whether a taxpayer’s reliance on professional tax
advice is reasonable and undertaken in good faith, courts have
12
considered whether the tax professional has a conflict of interest. The
focus on conflicts of interest is understandable—if the tax professional
has a personal interest in whether the taxpayer claims a position, the tax
advice may not reflect an objective assessment of the position’s merits.
If the advice is not an objective assessment, but rather a self-interested
assertion, there is little reason to permit the taxpayer to rely on the
advice to avoid penalties, assuming that the taxpayer knew or should
have known of the tax advisor’s own interest.
In many of the relevant court cases, the tax professionals’ conflicts
of interest were clear and egregious: tax professionals who developed or
marketed artificial tax shelters, prepared documents that created the
illusion of legitimate business transactions, based their opinions on
inaccurate factual assumptions, and were paid based on whether the
taxpayer entered into the transaction, or claimed the alleged tax savings.
However, in other cases, the factors suggesting a conflict of interest
12. Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1381-83 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’g
82 Fed. Cl. 636, 714-15 (2008); Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 481-83 (7th Cir.
2009); Mortensen v. Comm’r, 440 F.3d 375, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2006); Van Scoten v. Comm’r, 439
F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2006); Chamberlain v. Comm’r, 66 F.3d 729, 732-33 (5th Cir. 1995);
Goldman v. Comm’r, 39 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1994); Pasternak v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 893, 903
(6th Cir. 1993); Iles v. Comm’r, 982 F.2d 163, 164-66 (6th Cir. 1992); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund
v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 904-05 (E.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 568 F.3d
537 (5th Cir. 2009); Maguire Partners-Master Invs., LLC v. United States, No. CV 06–07371–
JFW(RZx), 2009 WL 4907033 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009); Murfam Farms, LLC ex. rel. Murphy v.
United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247-48 (2010); Alpha I, L.P. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 280
(2010); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 56-57 (2007); 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136
T.C. 67 (2011); Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199 (2010); New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v.
Comm’r, 132 T.C. 161, 193-95 (2009); Kerman v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1241 (2011); Palm
Canyon X Inv., LLC v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009); Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v.
Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005); CMA Consol., Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-16.
See also Mark W. Everson, IRS Penalty Policy Statement, 2003 TNT 249-9 (Dec. 29,
2003):
[t]axpayers may not rely on the advice of a tax advisor who has a financial arrangement
or a referral agreement with a tax shelter promoter. The tax advisor’s independent
judgment is compromised by these arrangements and agreements. Accordingly, the
Service will question the reasonableness and good faith of taxpayers who know or have
reason to know that the tax advisor is not independent. The Service will not accept
reliance on an opinion from a non-independent tax advisor as proof of reasonable cause
and good faith on the part of the taxpayer.
In a number of other cases, courts have considered whether non-tax professionals have a conflict of
interest precluding taxpayers’ reliance on their statements for purposes of a establishing reasonable
cause and good faith defense to penalties.
See, e.g., Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002)
(insurance agent); Anderson v. Comm’r, 62 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 1995) (independent broker);
Allison v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 568, 594, 598, 600 (2008) (investment advisor and accountant).
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were more subtle: the tax advisor developed or implemented the tax
strategy; the tax strategy was separable from the underlying business
transaction; the tax advisor influenced the facts on which his opinion
was based; the tax advisor did not charge standard hourly rates, or
agreed to receive a fee that was contingent on the completion of the
transaction; or the tax advisor’s legal analysis contained omissions or
errors.
Most of the cases fail to articulate a test for determining whether a
tax advisor has a disqualifying conflict of interest, other than stating
generalities about a tax advisor developing, promoting, or implementing
a tax shelter in which he has a financial interest. In only one case has
the court defined the circumstances when a tax advisor will be treated as
a “promoter,” by postulating a contrasting paradigm of the disinterested
and objective tax advisor.13 Under that paradigm, the tax advisor has a
long term and continual relationship with the taxpayer, the advisor does
not give unsolicited advice to the taxpayer, the advisor advises only
within his field of expertise, the advisor follows his regular course of
conduct in rendering the advice, the advisor charges only his regular
hourly rate, and the advisor has no other stake in the transaction.14
What the court decisions leave unclear is how to evaluate a
taxpayer’s reliance on tax advice when features of the ideal paradigm are
missing. In practice, one frequently finds cases where a taxpayer
engages a tax advisor for the first time to handle a transaction; where a
tax advisor brings a transaction to his client or alerts the client of the
need for tax advice; where a tax advisor takes a role in negotiating the
commercial terms of a transaction on which he is providing tax advice;
where a tax advisor makes relevant factual inquiries that are beyond the
his specific area of expertise; and where a taxpayer and a tax advisor
agree a fixed fee, or a fee that depends on whether the transaction
completes.
When one or more of the ideal features is missing, we need a
framework for analyzing whether to deny the taxpayer the ability to rely
on the tax advice to avoid penalties. How to define that framework
depends ultimately on the purpose of the reasonable cause and good
faith standard. If the purpose is to make predictions of the proper tax
treatment more reliable, the framework should identify each factor that
may induce an advisor to express overconfidence, and to balance the
potential distortive effects against the cost to a taxpayer of obtaining

13. See 106 Ltd., 136 T.C. 67.
14. Id. at 80.
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advice without that factor. On the other hand, if the purpose of the
reasonable cause and good faith standard is to avoid penalizing
taxpayers who did not have reason to know that their tax return positions
were incorrect, the framework should focus on whether a particular
conflict has distorted the advice and whether the taxpayer should have
known of the potential distortion.15
The reasonable cause and good faith test contains elements of both
purposes. To be relied upon, an opinion must satisfy certain objective
requirements that are likely to increase its predictive value: the advice
must be based on all pertinent facts and circumstances and the related
law; it must take into account the taxpayer’s purposes and their relative
weight; it must not be based on unreasonable assumptions or rely
unreasonably on factual sources; it generally must be supported by
certain types of legal authority and reach conclusions at a minimum
level of confidence. However, assuming those requirements are
satisfied, the regulations do not require that an opinion be rendered
under objectively perfect conditions. Instead, the regulations focus on
the taxpayer’s attempts to determine its proper tax liability.
The taxpayer’s attempts to determine its proper tax liability must
satisfy both an objective reasonableness standard and a subjective good
faith standard. Therefore, a court must consider both whether a
reasonably prudent taxpayer would recognize the temptation for an
advisor to give distorted advice, and whether the specific taxpayer
intentionally overlooked the potential distortion. Because it frequently is
difficult to know exactly what a taxpayer or an advisor was thinking, the
cases have tended to confuse the objective potential for distortion with
the distortion itself and create per se rules that disqualify advice where
the advisor has a conflict of interest.
In creating a per se rule, a court effectively makes a subjective
judgment about the level of temptation that a tax professional can resist.
There are two problems with this approach. First, what counts is not
whether a hypothetical tax advisor could resist the temptation, but how
the real, live tax advisor responded. Even without perfect knowledge of
the tax advisor’s subjective response, there usually is some evidence of
the manner in which the tax advisor behaved, and that information will
be more informative than a court’s speculations about a hypothetical
advisor.
15. See Doran, supra note 11, at 122 (tax penalties serve the instrumental function of
promoting tax compliance, and the function of defining tax compliance); Richard J. Wood,
Accuracy-Related Penalties: A Question of Values, 76 IOWA L. REV. 309, 320 (1991)
(“noncompliant taxpayers should be subject to penalty only if it would enhance compliance.”).
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Second, and more importantly, the focus of the reasonable cause
and good faith exception is not on the behavior of the tax advisor but
rather on that of the taxpayer. The most important factor is whether,
under all the pertinent facts and circumstances, the taxpayer has made a
16
Therefore, the
reasonable effort to assess its proper tax liability.
proper analysis should be the extent to which the taxpayer is aware of a
potential temptation for the tax advisor to distort his advice, and the
extent to which the circumstances indicate that the advisor has resisted
those potential temptations.
This article has five parts. The second part describes the statutory
and regulatory standards for taxpayers seeking to rely on tax advice to
avoid penalties. The third part describes the cases where a taxpayer has
sought to rely on the opinion of a tax advisor with a conflict of interest.
Those cases involve three types of situations: (1) tax advisors acting as
promoters or brokers of a tax shelter; (2) tax advisors with referral
arrangements with tax shelter promoters; and (3) tax advisors that are
developers or implementers of a tax strategy. Typically, in the first two
types of situations, it is easy to conclude that the taxpayer should have
known of the temptation for the tax advisor to provide distorted advice
and to determine that the advisor did not sufficiently resist such
temptation. However, in the third type of situation, the temptations
facing a tax advisor often are much more subtle, and it often is difficult
to isolate those temptations from many typical conditions facing a tax
advisor with a transactional practice. It likewise is difficult for a
taxpayer receiving advice in a transactional context to evaluate how the
advisor has responded to any temptation.
The fourth part of this article proposes a framework for analyzing
how a conflict of interest may affect the reliability of a tax advisor’s
opinion. It first argues that the analysis should not apply a per se rule,
but rather should determine reasonableness and good faith from the
perspective of what the taxpayer knew or should have known of the tax
advisor’s conflict and how the conflict may have affected the reliability
of the opinion. In the absence of a per se rule, a court first should
consider whether a conflict is relevant to the reliability of the opinion. If
the conflict is relevant, the court should consider both (1) the
inducement that the apparent conflict may have created to distort the
advice (“temptation”), and (2) the advisor’s apparent response to such
inducement (“resistance”). These two variables can be used to create a
framework where the level of apparent temptation is compared to the
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2003).
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level of apparent resistance. Thus, for example, a court should be more
vigilant in a case involving a high level of apparent temptation and a low
level of apparent resistance, than in a case involving a low level of
apparent temptation and a high level of apparent resistance. Finally, the
article explores common forms of temptation that tax advisors face when
advising on tax-motivated transactions, and considers the circumstances
when an advisor’s response to those temptations can make an opinion
unreliable.
II. STANDARDS FOR RELYING ON TAX ADVICE TO AVOID PENALTIES
Section 6664(c) of the Code and the associated Treasury
Regulations provides an exception to the penalties for fraud, negligence,
or disregard of rules or regulations, and substantial understatements of
federal income tax where the taxpayer shows that it had reasonable
cause for the position, and acted in good faith with respect to the
position.17 Treasury Regulation Section 1.6664-4(b)(1) states that:
the determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause
and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
all pertinent facts and circumstances. Generally, the most important
factor is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort to assess the taxpayer’s
proper tax liability. Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause
and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that
is reasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including
the experience, knowledge and education of the taxpayer. . . .
Reliance on professional tax advice constitutes reasonable cause and
good faith only if, under all the circumstances, such reliance was
18
reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith.

All facts and circumstances must be taken into account in
determining whether a taxpayer has reasonably relied in good faith on
19
such advice.
Treasury Regulation Section 1.6664-4(c)(1) states that a taxpayer
will not be considered to have reasonably relied on tax advice unless the
advice satisfies various requirements.20 First,
the advice must be based upon all pertinent facts and circumstances
and the law as it relates to those facts and circumstances. For example,

17. Id. § 6664 (c).
18. Id. §1.6664-4(b).
19. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1). For example, the taxpayer’s education, sophistication, and business
experience will be relevant.
20. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).
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the advice must take into account the taxpayer’s purposes (and the
relative weight of such purposes) for entering into a transaction and for
structuring a transaction in a particular manner. In addition, [the
advice] will not qualify if the taxpayer fails to disclose a fact that it
knew, or reasonably should have known, was to the proper tax
21
treatment of the transaction.

Second,
the advice must not be based on unreasonable factual or legal
assumptions (including assumptions as to future events) and must not
unreasonably rely on the representations, statements, findings, or
agreements of the taxpayer or any other person. For example, the
advice must not be based upon a representation or assumption which
the taxpayer knew, or had reason to know, was unlikely to be true,
such as an inaccurate representation or assumption as to the taxpayer’s
purposes for entering into a transaction or for structuring a transaction
22
in a particular manner.

Third, “a taxpayer may not rely on an opinion or advice that a
regulation is invalid unless the taxpayer adequately disclosed the
23
If the
position that the regulation in question is invalid.”
underpayment is attributable to a reportable transaction, failure by the
taxpayer to properly disclose the transaction is a strong indication that
the taxpayer did not act in good faith.24
Treasury Regulation Section 1.6664-4(f) contains special rules for
purposes of applying the reasonable cause and good faith exception to
tax shelter items of corporations.25 A corporation’s legal justification
may be taken into account only if (1) there is substantial authority for the
tax treatment of the item, and (2) based on all facts and circumstances,
the corporation reasonably believed, at the time the tax return was filed,
that the tax treatment of the item was more likely than not the proper
treatment.26 The reasonable belief requirement will be considered
satisfied if either:
• The corporation analyzed the pertinent facts and authorities in the
manner described in Treasury Regulation Section 1.6662-

21. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i).
22. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2003).
23. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(iii).
24. Id. § 1.6664-4(d).
25. Id. § 1.6664-4(f). In the case of reportable transactions subject to the penalty in I.R.C. §
6662A, the rules in Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f) are effectively superseded by the rules contained in
I.R.C. § 6664(d), discussed below.
26. Id. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(B).
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4(d)(3)(ii) (relating to the substantial authority test), and in
reliance upon that analysis, reasonably concluded in good faith
that there was a greater than 50% likelihood that the tax
treatment of the item would be upheld if challenged by the IRS;
or
• The corporation reasonably relied in good faith on the opinion of
a professional tax advisor that meets the requirements of
Treasury Regulation Section 1.6664-4(c), described above, the
opinion is based on the tax advisor’s analysis of the pertinent
facts and authorities in the manner described in Treasury
Regulation Section 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (relating to the substantial
authority test), and the opinion unambiguously states the tax
advisor’s conclusion that there is a greater than 50% likelihood
that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by
the IRS.27
The analysis must not take into account the possibility that a tax
return will not be audited, that an issue will not be raised on audit, or
that an issue will be settled.28
Although satisfaction of the foregoing requirements
is an important factor to be considered in determining whether a
corporate taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith, it is
not necessarily dispositive.
For example, depending on the
circumstances, satisfaction of the minimum requirements may not be
dispositive if the taxpayer’s participation in the tax shelter lacked
significant business purpose, if the taxpayer claimed tax benefits that
are unreasonable in comparison to the taxpayer’s investment in the tax
shelter, or if the taxpayer agreed with the organizer or promoter of the
tax shelter that the taxpayer would protect the confidentiality of the tax
29
aspects of the structure of the tax shelter.

Section 6664(d) of the Code provides special rules for applying the
reasonable cause and good faith exception to the penalty under Section
6662A of the Code for understatements arising from “reportable
transactions,” which include “listed transactions” and other transactions
having certain characteristics that are commonly found in abusive tax
shelters.30 The exception will not apply unless (A) the position is
adequately disclosed (or the penalty for non-disclosure was rescinded),

27.
28.
29.
30.
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(B) there is or was substantial authority for the position, and (C) the
taxpayer reasonably believed that such treatment was more likely than
31
A taxpayer will be treated as having a
not the proper treatment.
reasonable belief with respect to the tax treatment of a position only if
such belief (i) is based on the facts and law that exist at the time the
relevant return is filed, and (ii) relates solely to the taxpayer’s chances of
success on the merits of such treatment and does not take into account
the possibility that a return will not be audited, such treatment will not
be raised on audit, or such treatment will be resolved through settlement
if it is raised.32
In addition, under section 6664(d)(4)(B) of the Code, an opinion of
a tax advisor may not be relied upon to establish the reasonable belief of
a taxpayer if the tax advisor is a “disqualified tax advisor,” or the
33
opinion is a “disqualified opinion.” A tax advisor is disqualified if the
tax advisor:
34

(I) is a material advisor” . . . and participates in the organization,
management, promotion or sale of the transaction or is related to any

31. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3).
32. Id. § 6664(d)(4).
33. Id. § 6664(d)(4)(B).
34. A material advisor is a person who provides material aid, assistance, or advice with
respect to organizing, managing, promoting, selling, implementing, insuring, or carrying out any
reportable transaction, and who directly or indirectly derives gross income in excess of a threshold
amount for such aid, assistance or advice. Id. § 6111(b)(1).
Notice 2005-12, 2005-7 I.R.B. 494, clarifies when a material advisor will be treated as
participating in the organization, management, promotion, or sale of the transaction. A material
advisor participates in the organization of a transaction if the advisor (1) devises, creates,
investigates, or initiates the transaction or tax strategy, (2) devises the business or financial plans for
the transaction or tax strategy, (3) carries out those plans through negotiations or transactions with
others, or (4) performs acts relating to the development or establishment of the transaction,
including preparing documents that (A) establish the structure used in connection with the
transaction, (B) describe the transaction for use in the promotion or sale of the transaction, or (C)
register the transaction with any federal, state, or local government body. A material advisor
participates in the management of a transaction if the material advisor is involved in the decisionmaking process regarding any business activity with respect to the transaction. Participation in the
management of the transaction includes managing assets, directing business activity, or acting as
general partner, trustee, director, or officer of an entity involved in the transaction. A material
advisor participates in the promotion or sale of a transaction if the material advisor is involved in the
marketing of the transaction or tax strategy. Marketing activities include (1) soliciting, directly or
through an agent, taxpayers to enter into a transaction or tax strategy, (2) placing an advertisement
for the transaction, or (3) instructing or advising others with respect to marketing of the transaction
or tax strategy. A tax advisor, including a material advisor, will not be treated as participating in the
organization, management, promotion, or sale of a transaction if the tax advisor’s only involvement
is rendering an opinion regarding the tax consequences of the transaction. In the course of
preparing a tax opinion, a tax advisor is permitted to suggest modifications to the transaction, but
the tax advisor may not suggest material modifications to the transaction that assist the taxpayer in
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person who so participates, (II) is compensated directly or indirectly by
a material advisor for the transaction, (III) has a fee arrangement with
respect to the transaction which is contingent on all or part of the
intended tax benefits of the transaction being sustained, or (IV) as
determined under regulations, has a disqualifying financial interest
35
with respect to the transaction.

An opinion is disqualified if the opinion (I) is based on
unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to
future events), (II) unreasonably relies on representations, statements,
findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person, (III) does
not identify and consider all relevant facts, or (IV) fails to meet any
other requirement as the IRS may prescribe.36
Section 10.35 of Treasury Department Circular 230 sets forth
standards that a tax advisor must apply in providing certain tax
opinions.37 These standards apply to tax advisor opinions addressing tax
issues arising from listed transactions, transactions having tax avoidance
as their principal purpose, and transactions with a significant taxavoidance purpose, provided the opinion meets certain qualifications.38
These qualifications are: (1) the opinion reaches a level of confidence
39
that permits the taxpayer to rely on the opinion to avoid penalties, (2)

obtaining the anticipated tax benefits. Merely performing support services or ministerial functions
such as typing, photocopying, or printing will not be considered participation in the organization,
management, promotion, or sale of a transaction.
35. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii); see also Notice 2005-12. Notice 2005-12 states that a tax
advisor will be treated as a disqualified tax advisor, even if not a material advisor, if the tax advisor
has a referral fee or a fee-sharing arrangement by which the advisor is compensated directly or
indirectly by a material advisor. In addition, an arrangement will be treated as a disqualified
compensation arrangement if there is an agreement or understanding with a material advisor
pursuant to which the tax advisor is expected to render a favorable opinion regarding the tax
treatment of the transaction to any person referred by the material advisor. A tax advisor will not be
treated as having a disqualified compensation arrangement if a material advisor merely recommends
the tax advisor who does not have an agreement or understanding with the material advisor to
render a favorable opinion regarding the tax treatment of the transaction.
36. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(iii).
37. Circular 230 contains the rules governing practice before the IRS and is codified at 31
C.F.R. Subtitle A, Part 10.
38. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B) (2011).
39. Id. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(1), (b)(4) (2011). Specifically, the standards apply if the opinion
concludes that there is a greater than 50% likelihood that the tax treatment of an item will be upheld
if challenged by the IRS and does not include a prominent statement that the opinion may not be
used by the taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties. Id. The presence of such a statement
does not in itself prevent a taxpayer from relying on the opinion to avoid penalties. See also David
T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First Amendment Limitations
on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 858 (2006).
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the opinion will be used to market the transaction,40 (3) the tax advisor
requires the taxpayer to maintain the confidentiality of the advisor’s tax
41
strategies, or (4) the advisor’s fees are conditioned on the taxpayer
obtaining the intended tax benefits.42
The standards include a
requirement that the opinion prominently disclose any compensation
arrangement or referral agreement that the tax advisor (or his firm) has
with a third party with respect to the promotion, marketing, or
43
recommendation of the relevant transaction, and in the case of an
opinion used to market a transaction, that the opinion was written to
support the promotion or marketing of the transaction.44
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The regulations under the general reasonable cause and good faith
exception do not explicitly preclude a taxpayer from relying on advice
from an advisor having a conflict of interest.45 However, the courts
have developed the principle that a taxpayer’s reliance on advice will not
be considered reasonable and undertaken in good faith where the
taxpayer knew or should have known that the advisor had a significant
conflict of interest.
In a number of cases, the tax advisor’s conflict of interest is
obvious.
Those cases generally involve situations where the
40. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(2), (b)(5). Specifically, the standards apply if the tax
advisor knows or has reason to know that the opinion will be used or referred to by a third party in
promoting, marketing, or recommending the relevant transaction, and the opinion does not include
prominent statements that the opinion may not be used by the taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding
penalties, the opinion was written to support the promotion or marketing of the transaction, and the
taxpayer should seek advice based on the taxpayer’s particular circumstances from an independent
tax advisor.
41. Id. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(3), (b)(6). Specifically, the standards apply if the tax advisor
imposes a limitation on disclosure of the tax treatment or tax structure of the transaction and the
limitation on disclosure protects the confidentiality of the advisor’s tax strategies, regardless of
whether the limitation on disclosure is legally binding. A claim that a transaction is proprietary or
exclusive is not a limitation on disclosure if the advisor confirms to all recipients of the opinion that
there is no limitation on disclosure of the tax treatment or tax structure of the relevant transaction.
42. Id. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(7), (b)(7). Specifically, the standards apply if the taxpayer has the
right to a full or partial refund of fees if all or a part of the intended tax consequences from the
matters addressed in the opinion are not sustained, or if the fees are contingent on the taxpayer’s
realization of tax benefits from the transaction.
43. Id. § 10.35(e)(1).
44. Id. § 10.35(e)(2). The legend for an opinion used to market a transaction also must
disclose that the taxpayer should seek advice based on the taxpayer’s particular circumstances from
an independent tax advisor.
45. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B) (2006). As discussed above, under Code § 6664(d)(4)(B), a
taxpayer may not rely on the opinion of a “disqualified tax advisor” to establish a reasonable cause
and good faith defense to the penalty for reportable transaction understatements.
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professional tax advisor was a promoter of a tax shelter,46 a broker,47 or
48
had a referral arrangement with a promoter. In many of those cases,
the advisor also developed or implemented the tax shelter. In other
cases, the conflicts of interest are less apparent. Those cases generally
involve tax advisors that were developers or implementers of a tax
strategy, but had not engaged in marketing activity and had no
relationship with a tax shelter promoter.49 As discussed below, many of
the cases where a tax advisor was a promoter or broker, or had a referral
arrangement with a promoter, are interesting for their facts, which
illustrate tax advisors confronting the tension between their roles as
advisors and their roles as promoters or brokers. However, with one
exception, those cases fail to articulate a test for determining whether a
tax advisor has a disqualifying conflict of interest, other than stating
generalities about a tax advisor developing, promoting, or implementing
a tax shelter in which he has a financial interest. The cases where a tax
advisor is merely the developer or implementer of a tax strategy are
interesting because of the courts’ attempts to identify and analyze more
subtle conflicts of interest.
A.

Tax Advisors as Promoters or Brokers

The most obvious conflict of interest is where a tax advisor also is
the promoter of a tax shelter, or acts essentially as a broker, and is
compensated as such by the tax shelter promoter. In those cases, the tax
advisor has a direct financial interest in the tax savings being promoted,
frequently through compensation based on the amount of the purported

46. See Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1381-83 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Mortensen v. Comm’r, 440 F.3d 375, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2006); Van Scoten v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d
1243, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2006); Pasternak v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 893, 903 (6th Cir. 1993); Iles v.
Comm’r, 982 F.2d 163, 164-66 (6th Cir. 1992); Maguire Partners-Master Invs., LLC v. United
States, No. CV 06–07371–JFW(RZx), 2009 WL 4907033 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009); Murfam
Farms, LLC ex. rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247-48 (2010); Jade Trading, LLC v.
United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 56-57 (2007); 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 67, 79 (2011); New
Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 161, 193-95 (2009); Kerman v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1241 (2011); Palm Canyon X Inv., LLC v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009).
47. Stobie Creek, 608 F.3d at 1381-83; Goldman v. Comm’r, 39 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1994);
Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (insurance agent).
48. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 904-05 (E.D. Tex.
3007) ), aff’d on other grounds, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Alpha I, L.P. v. United States, 93
Fed. Cl. 280 (2010).
49. Am. Boat Co., LLC v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 481-83 (7th Cir. 2009); Canal Corp. v.
Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199 (2010).
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tax savings.50 Because the tax advisor has a personal interest in the
purported tax savings, a taxpayer reasonably should discount the advice
51
when seeking to determine its proper tax liability.
For example, in Stobie Creek, the court held that the taxpayers
could not rely on the advice of two law firms because they knew or
should have known that both law firms participated in the promotion and
implementation of a tax shelter, and received fees based on the amount
of purported tax savings.52 In reaching its conclusion, the court stated
the principle that “[a]dvice hardly qualifies as disinterested or objective
if it comes from parties who actively promote or implement the
transaction in question.”53
The taxpayers in Stobie Creek, all members of a family, agreed to
sell a 50% interest in the family business.54 They turned to the
relationship partner of the law firm (“SLK”) that had regularly advised
55
the family and the business, to negotiate and document the sale.
Because the transaction would be taxable, the family asked if SLK was
56
SLK
familiar with any strategies that could reduce the taxes.
previously had assisted other clients in connection with a tax shelter
promoted by another law firm (“J&G”).57 An SLK tax lawyer contacted
a J&G tax partner, arranged for confidentiality agreements to be
prepared and signed by family members, and proposed a fee
arrangement, based on the amount of tax savings, to be shared by SLK
58
and J&G.

50. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(4) (as amended in 2003). If the advisor’s fees are conditioned
on the taxpayer deriving the intended tax benefits, or are refundable to the taxpayer if such benefits
are denied, the transaction generally will be a reportable transaction. In that case, the more stringent
rules of I.R.C. § 6664(d) will prevent the taxpayer from relying on the advisor’s opinion to establish
reasonable cause and good faith. Also, the opinion will be subject to the standards of Circular 230 §
10.35 discussed above.
51. If the tax advisor complies with Circular 230, the taxpayer will have been informed in the
opinion of any compensation arrangement that the advisor has with a third party promoter or broker,
and whether the opinion was prepared to support the marketing of the transaction by a third party
promoter or broker.
52. Stobie Creek, 608 F.3d at 1382-83. The court also concluded that the taxpayers could not
rely on the opinion because they should have recognized that the purported tax benefits were “too
good to be true.” Id. at 1383.
53. Id. at 1382.
54. Id. at 1369-70.
55. Id. at 1369.
56. Id. at 1370.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1371.
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At a family meeting, the SLK relationship partner made a
59
When asked whether he
presentation on the proposed tax shelter.
would engage in the strategy if he were in the family’s position, he
confirmed that he would, and the family agreed to pursue the strategy
with SLK’s assistance.60 The relationship partner later sent a sample
opinion that would be rendered by J&G.61 In a cover letter, he noted
that the IRS was attacking tax shelters generally, but distinguished the
62
He nevertheless
tax shelter being proposed by SLK and J&G.
discussed the possibility of penalties being imposed if the transaction
were disallowed.63 He noted that J&G had offered to SLK a portion of
J&G’s fee, and stated that SLK was “not recommending” that the family
64
He explained that SLK was prohibited under a
pursue the strategy.
confidentiality agreement with J&G from rendering an opinion on the
tax shelter, and therefore SLK had no occasion to determine whether it
would be prepared to issue such an opinion.65 Finally, the relationship
partner pointed out that the opinion would be based on representations
from the family, notably about its profit motive and non-tax business
reasons for entering into the tax shelter.66
SLK and J&G prepared the tax shelter documentation, which
included certain undated or backdated documents, and draft tax
returns.67 Following the closing, the SLK relationship partner reminded
the family of the fee arrangement, but expressed willingness either to
68
He
waive a portion of the fee or to make a charitable contribution.
also indicated that if the family decided not to claim the purported tax
benefits, SLK would not charge its fee.69 Ultimately, SLK received the
entire fee but made a charitable contribution of a small fraction of the
70
fee.
Before tax returns were filed, the IRS issued a notice describing
and rebutting certain similar tax shelters, and qualifying them as “listed
transactions.”71 SLK tax lawyers prepared an internal memorandum that
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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attempted to distinguish the tax shelter entered into by the family from
72
the transactions described in the IRS notice. The relationship partner
hand wrote on the memorandum the comments, “B.S.,” “we don't
qualify,” “looks like us,” and “I wouldn’t count on this.”73 The
relationship partner called the family to alert them about the notice,
74
He
shared his concerns, and related his tax colleagues’ analysis.
recommended that a conference call be scheduled with J&G, to have that
75
In that call, the J&G tax partner stated that J&G’s
firm’s view.
opinion committee had reviewed the notice and determined that it did
not affect transactions of the type entered into by the family, and that
J&G would provide an opinion to that effect.76 She gave three reasons
for the conclusion that the notice was inapplicable, and said that other
taxpayers were continuing to pursue transactions of that type.77 The
SLK relationship partner stated at the end of the call that he had heard
78
enough and was satisfied with J&G’s opinion.
An SLK tax lawyer sent to the family a draft of the J&G tax
opinion, and a family member discussed with him the various
representations from the family that were included in the draft opinion,
notably about the family’s profit motive and non-tax business reasons
for entering into the tax shelter.79 The draft opinion also contained a
statement that J&G had been informed that an objective investment
analysis indicated a substantial probability that the transactions would
generate a profit before taxes.80 SLK tax lawyers considered that
statement, assumed that J&G had received such an analysis from
someone else, and made no further inquiries.81
In New Phoenix Sunrise, the court held under a similar set of facts
to those in Stobie Creek that the taxpayers could not rely on a tax
opinion of a law firm that actively participated in the development,
structuring, promotion, sale, and implementation of a tax shelter, in
circumstances where the taxpayers’ independent lawyers expressed
concerns about that the tax shelter, and the taxpayers should have known

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 653-54.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 654-55.
Id. at 655.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the law firm had a personal stake in the tax shelter.82 In reaching its
conclusion, the court stated its conclusions as follows:
We find petitioner’s reliance on Jenkens & Gilchrist and the tax
opinion to be unreasonable rather than reasonable. Jenkens & Gilchrist
actively participated in the development, structuring, promotion, sale,
and implementation of the BLISS transaction. Petitioner was not
reasonable in relying on the tax opinion in the face of such a conflict of
83
interest.

The taxpayers in New Phoenix Sunrise were members of a family
84
that sold a family-owned business at a substantial gain. A partner in
the law firm (“B&E”) that was handling the sale introduced the family to
the same J&G law firm that appeared in Stobie Creek, and provided
information to J&G to assist in preparing a proposal for a tax shelter.85
J&G prepared documents for the tax shelter transaction, many of which
were undated or backdated.86 After the tax shelter transaction closed,
the B&E partner communicated to J&G that he felt incapable of advising
87
the accountants regarding the proper reporting of the transaction. The
B&E partner also forwarded to a family member a news article about
88
The B&E partner
IRS actions to challenge abusive tax shelters.
advised the family member that in view of the news article and possible
IRS action, it was important to prepare and file the tax returns as soon as
possible.89 Subsequently, the Treasury Department issued regulations
requiring the disclosure of certain tax shelters.90 The B&E partner
discussed those regulations with J&G, which indicated that the new
regulations applied to the tax shelter “and that not disclosing it was an
aggressive position to take.”91 J&G nevertheless issued a favorable tax
opinion regarding the shelter.92 The B&E partner discussed the new
regulations with the family member and informed him “that not
disclosing the transaction was an aggressive position requiring approval

82. New Phoenix Sunrise v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 161, 193-95 (2009). The court also concluded
that the taxpayers could not rely on the opinion because they should have recognized that the
purported tax benefits were “too good to be true.” Id. at 195.
83. Id. at 193.
84. Id. at 164.
85. Id. at 164-65.
86. Id. at 165.
87. Id. at 170.
88. Id. at 171.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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of the tax return preparer.”93 The family member later responded that he
intended to take “as aggressive a position as possible in filing the tax
94
The B&E partner subsequently discussed with J&G the
return.”
possibility that the transaction was “substantially similar” to certain
listed transactions described in an IRS notice, the possibility of being
audited if the taxpayer disclosed the transaction, and penalties that might
apply.95
In Murfam Farms, the court held that the taxpayers could not rely
on the tax opinion of a national accounting firm that sold them a tax
shelter and received a fee equal to a percentage of the purported tax loss,
in circumstances where the accounting firm took actions to shield itself
from liability after the IRS announced that it would challenge similar tax
shelters.96 The taxpayers were members of a family that disposed of the
97
The business had
family business in a partially taxable transaction.
98
regularly used the accounting firm for tax advice. The Chief Financial
Officer (“CFO”) of the business asked the accounting firm about
99
strategies to reduce taxes on the sale. Partners of the accounting firm
met with the CFO to propose a tax shelter, and there was a subsequent
meeting with family members.100 The accounting firm’s policies
required prospective clients for the shelter to need a desired loss of at
101
least $50 million, and to be “[a]ggressive, willing to assume tax risk.”
No marketing documentation could be left with the client and clients
102
The engagement
were required to sign nondisclosure agreements.
letters with clients referred to a “desired loss” of a specified amount.103
Fees were calculated as a share of the purported tax loss.104 The
accounting firm would arrange to have law firms issue legal opinions
105
that it believed would provide clients with “penalty protection.”

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Murfam Farms, LLC ex rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247-48 (Ct. Cl.
2010). The court also concluded that the taxpayers could not rely on the opinion because they
should have recognized that the purported tax benefits were “too good to be true.” Id. at 247.
97. Id. at 237-38.
98. Id. at 238.
99. Id. at 239.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 240.
104. Id. at 239.
105. Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol27/iss1/3

20

Moldenhauer: Penalty Protection Opinions and Advisor Conflicts of Interest

9- MOLDENHAUER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

2012]

PENALTY PROTECTION OPINIONS

4/11/2012 1:24 PM

75

The family members received engagement letters from the
accounting firm shortly after the IRS had issued a notice warning
taxpayers that certain loss-generating strategies were ineffective, and
could subject taxpayers to penalties.106 After the IRS challenge to tax
shelters received press attention, the accounting firm held a meeting in
107
The accounting
which it decided not to further market the tax shelter.
firm acknowledged internally that it saw a problem with the tax shelter
because of a “lack of meaningful potential for an economic profit or
other business purpose to justify the transaction.”108 The accounting
firm instructed its personnel to advise clients who previously had shown
willingness to enter into the shelter of the heightened risk of IRS
scrutiny and penalties.109 Nevertheless, the accounting firm instructed
its personnel to express confidence in earlier transactions, and to try to
avoid losing existing clients to competitors offering similar shelters. It
reiterated internally the importance that the tax shelter clients be
“sophisticated investors who fully understood the economic and tax risks
of the transaction, and who would not be likely to seek compensation
from the accounting firm if the anticipated tax benefits were not
ultimately realized.”110
The accounting firm informed the CFO of the IRS notice, and
communicated that the transaction was very risky. But, the CFO
responded that if he did not do a transaction with the accounting firm; he
111
As a
had other opportunities to do similar transactions with others.
condition to proceeding with the transaction, the accounting firm
required the family members to sign addenda to their engagement letters
holding the accounting firm harmless from penalties that might be
assessed against them.112
The accounting firm made another
presentation regarding the shelter in which it characterized the shelter as
aggressive, and arranged for a law firm to prepare the documentation
and a tax opinion.113 The law firm did not interact directly with the
family.114 The family paid a fee equal to two percent of the purported
tax loss generated by the transaction to the accounting firm, and a large

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012

Id. at 240.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id. at 242.

21

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 27 [2012], Art. 3

9- MOLDENHAUER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

76

4/11/2012 1:24 PM

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[27:55

fee to the law firm, even though the law firm’s tax opinion had not yet
115
been sent.
After the family entered into the tax shelter transaction, but before
tax returns were prepared, the accounting firm became increasingly
uneasy with the shelter, which was receiving further press attention.116
During this period, the IRS issued a notice describing and rebutting
similar tax shelters, and qualifying them as “listed transactions.”117 The
head of the accounting firm’s tax shelter marketing team recognized that
the notice essentially described the shelter, and directed the team
members inform clients of the notice, and indicate that the accounting
118
When senior
firm would be considering its potential impact.
accounting firm executives expressed concern about the tax shelter
entered into by the family, the team head assured them that the family
had agreed to hold the accounting firm harmless from any penalties, that
the transaction had completed, and that the law firm was planning to
issue its opinion.119 When told of another client interested in the shelter,
the team head refused the opportunity, noting the IRS’ intention to
120
impose penalties on any taxpayer engaging in the shelter.
After the family completed the tax shelter transaction, the
accounting firm prepared tax returns and charged additional fees,
resulting in a total of 2.5 percent of the purported tax loss.121 The tax
returns did not include specific disclosures of the strategy.122
In 106 Ltd., the court held that the taxpayer could not rely on the
opinion of a lawyer who solicited the taxpayer’s involvement in a tax
shelter, structured and implemented the transaction, and conditioned his
123
The court also
fee on the taxpayer going through with the transaction.
held that the taxpayer could not rely on the advice and tax return
preparation work of accountants who had marketed similar tax shelters
and charged a premium for preparing the relevant tax returns.124 The
taxpayer was a businessman and investor who received a pitch from his
long-time lawyer to enter into a purported investment transaction that in
fact was a highly structured tax shelter. The taxpayer understood that

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 243.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 252.
See 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 67, 81 (2011).
Id.
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the real benefit of the transaction was the purported tax reductions, not
to generate an economic profit, and agreed to enter into the transaction
after receiving confirmation from his accountants that they had used the
same transaction, and after the lawyer personally promised to cover any
125
The
taxes, penalties, or litigation costs if the transaction blew up.
lawyer provided a tax opinion that the accountants referred to in
preparing the relevant returns.126 The opinion stated that the taxpayer
127
The
had made various representations, that in fact were inaccurate.
lawyer received a large fee, and the accountants received a fee
substantially greater than what they normally charged.128
The court articulated a three-factor test for determining whether the
taxpayer properly relied on the advice of the lawyer and the accountants:
(1) whether the advisors were competent professionals who had
sufficient expertise to justify reliance; (2) whether the taxpayer provided
the necessary and accurate information to the advisors; and (3) whether
the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the advisor’s judgment.129
The court found the first two factors present, but concluded that the
taxpayer did not actually rely in good faith on the advice of the lawyer
and the accountants for three reasons.130 First, the court found that the
taxpayer’s high level of business sophistication and expertise “ma[de] it
131
harder to believe that he didn’t know the transaction was improper.”
Second, the court found that the taxpayer should have been alerted by
the inaccurate statements in the opinion that purported to set forth the
taxpayer’s representations. As the court stated, “[o]ne doesn’t need look
very hard to find problems with Garza’s opinion.”132
Third, the court determined that the lawyer and the accountants
were “promoters” of the transaction, whose advice was inherently
unreliable.133 In making this determination, the court sought to
134
It defined a promoter
articulate the factors characterizing a promoter.
as “an advisor who participated in structuring the transaction or is
otherwise related to, has an interest in, or profits from the

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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transaction.”135 The court noted that “[o]ne might need to be careful in
applying the definition to some kinds of transactions,” stating that a tax
lawyer asked by a businessman for advice on how to sell the family
business through a tax-favored stock redemption might be said to have
136
However, the court found the
“participated in the transaction.”
definition workable “when the transaction involved is the same tax
shelter offered to numerous parties.”137 Finally, court stated that a tax
advisor is not a “promoter” of a tax shelter transaction where the
advisor:
• Has a long-term and continual relationship with the client;
• Does not give unsolicited advice regarding the tax shelter;
• Advises only within the advisor’s field of expertise (and not
because of the advisor’s regular involvement in the transaction
being scrutinized);
• Follows the advisor’s regular course of conduct in rendering the
advice; and
• Has no stake in the transaction besides what the advisor bills at
the advisor’s regular hourly rate.138
Factually, it is not difficult to conclude that the tax advisor’s
opinion in 106 Ltd. was unreliable. The lawyer solicited the taxpayer to
enter into the transaction, which had no meaningful purpose other than
to avoid taxes. The lawyer’s opinion contained misleading statements to
disguise the weakness of the taxpayer’s position, and the lawyer and the
accountants were paid substantial sums to implement and report the
transaction. However, the Tax Court’s narrow definition of the
circumstances where a tax advisor will not be treated as a promoter
reaches substantially beyond the facts of the case.139
135. Id. at 79 (quoting Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1622 (2009)).
136. Id. at 80.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Countryside Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 347, 352-55 (2009)).
139. The circumstances articulated by the Tax Court in 106 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 67
(2011), where a tax advisor is not a “promoter,” was based on its opinion in Countryside Ltd.
Partnership v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 347 (2009). In that case, the court held that the so-called
federally authorized tax practitioner (“FATP”) privilege set forth in Code § 7525(a) applied to
advice because it was not provided in connection with promoting corporate participation in a tax
shelter. The IRS asserted that the accountant in question was involved in organizing, structuring,
and assisting with respect to certain tax shelter transactions. The court found that the accountant
had a long, close relationship with the taxpayer, preparing returns, assisting with tax planning when
asked, answering questions when asked, and responding to notices and inquiries from federal and
state tax officials. The court further found that his advice with respect to the transactions in
question was furnished (as was similar advice with respect to similar transactions) as part of a longstanding, ongoing, and hence, routine relationship with the taxpayer. The accountant provided tax
advice to the taxpayer when requested to do so, and his advice provided in connection with the
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The definition articulated by the court in 106 Ltd. implies that a tax
advisor who provides advice regarding a marketed tax shelter will be
treated as a promoter if any of the requirements listed above are missing.
For example, if a taxpayer seeks out a tax advisor with whom the
taxpayer has had no prior relationship, that tax advisor apparently would
be treated as a promoter under the court’s test, even if the tax advisor
serves in purely an advisory role to the taxpayer, charges standard hourly
rates, and has no other connection with the transaction. This per se
approach is troubling because it does not consider whether, under the
specific facts and circumstances of the case, the advisor was subject to
any meaningful temptation to provide distorted advice, or how the
advisor may have responded to any such temptation. As discussed
below, other courts have specifically rejected a per se rule because the
determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in
good faith is to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all
pertinent facts and circumstances.140 A per se test of the type articulated
by the court in 106 Ltd. is inconsistent with the purpose of the
reasonable cause and good faith exception to shield taxpayers that did
not have reason to know their positions were incorrect. Specifically, a
per se test does not evaluate the taxpayer’s efforts to assess its proper tax
liability, or the reasonableness of the taxpayer under the circumstances
to rely on the tax advisor’s opinion.

transactions followed the same regular course of procedure as did his other tax advice, including
with respect to similar transactions. The accounting firm with which he was employed had no stake
in the outcome of the transactions other than the continued retention of the taxpayer as a client. It
did not receive a fixed fee or a fee based on a percentage of some claimed tax saving. It was paid
by the hour pursuant to the accountant’s normal rate schedule. On that basis, the court stated that:
[t]here may be a point at which an FATP’s actions cross the line, and will no longer be
encompassed within the routine relationship between an FATP and his client and will
amount to tax shelter promotion. Respondent has, however, failed to show us that Mr.
Egan’s communications with the Winn organization with respect to the partnership
redemptions and associated transactions before us crossed that line.
In making its decision, the court referred to the legislative history of the FATP privilege, which
expressed the Conference Committee’s anticipation that the tax shelter limitation to the FATP
privilege would not adversely affect “the routine relationship between a tax practitioner and a
client.” Id. at 353-54 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 269 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)). The court did
not articulate a specific test defining when such a routine relationship would exist, or assert that it
would only exist under circumstances similar to the facts found in Countryside. Given the highly
factual determination of the court in Countryside, and that the case did not address whether a
taxpayer could rely on an opinion to avoid penalties, the decision provides little support for the
precise test articulated by the court in 106 Ltd.
140. See also Allison v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 568, 587-88 (Ct. Cl. 2006) (rejecting a per
se rule in the context of advice provided by an investment advisor and an accountant who assisted in
due diligence of a tax shelter investment).
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Tax Advisors Having Referral Relationships with Promoters

When a tax shelter promoter refers a taxpayer to a tax advisor, it is
reasonable to assume that the promoter is confident that the tax advisor
will provide favorable advice. The tax advisor may have an explicit
agreement or an implicit understanding with the promoter that the tax
advisor will provide favorable advice, and that in exchange the promoter
will make additional referrals.141 In those circumstances, courts
generally have found the tax advisors’ opinions unreliable.
For example, in Alpha I, a tax shelter promoter referred the
taxpayer to a lawyer to obtain an opinion.142 The promoter had
promised the taxpayers that the strategy would eliminate taxes, and that
by receiving the opinion the taxpayers would avoid any penalties if the
strategy was ineffective. The court held that the taxpayers could not rely
on the opinion because (1) the opinion was obtained under an assurance
from the promoter that it would protect the taxpayers from penalties, (2)
the taxpayers failed to inform the law firm that the promoter had
promised that the strategy would eliminate taxes, and (3) the opinion
recited that the taxpayers would not pay fees to any adviser based on tax
savings from the strategy when in fact the promoter would receive 25%
of the tax savings.143 In this decision, the court did not specifically
conclude that the law firm had intentionally included the
misrepresentation, recognizing the possibility that the taxpayers had
failed to provide that information to the law firm regarding the fees
charged by the promoter. However, the court noted the fact that the law
firm received a flat fee of $300,000 for the opinion and concluded that
given the taxpayers’ level of education and sophistication, they failed to
establish that their reliance on the opinion was reasonable and
undertaken in good faith.144
Reading between the lines, the court in Alpha I seems to have
thought it likely that all participants—the taxpayers, the promoter, and
the law firm—intended the opinion to be window dressing to protect
against penalties in case the strategy was discovered by the IRS and
disallowed. The misrepresentation in the opinion about fees not being
based on the claimed tax savings suggested an intention to mislead the

141. If the tax advisor complies with Circular 230, the taxpayer will have been informed in the
opinion of the referral arrangement.
142. Alpha I, L.P. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 280 (Ct. Cl. 2010).
143. Id. at 315-18, 324-26.
144. Id. at 317.
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IRS and the courts on the part of the taxpayers, if not on the part of the
law firm.
By contrast, in Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United
States,145 the court held that the taxpayers could rely in part on an
opinion furnished by a law firm that also represented the tax shelter
146
The court noted that the opinion “provided a reasonable
promoter.
interpretation of the law,” and that the taxpayers provided expert
testimony that the opinions had complied with standards common to the
profession and with the administrative standards of conduct for tax
practitioners under Circular 230.147 The court dismissed the conflict of
interest resulting from the law firm’s representation of the promoter by
noting that the taxpayers (themselves lawyers) “concluded that there
would be no conflict of interest with Holland & Hart’s representation of
Presidio because their interests in the tax treatment of their investments
were the same.”148
The court’s analysis of the conflict of interest issue in Klamath
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding. Obviously, both the taxpayers
and the promoter stood to gain if the strategy was upheld, or if the
opinion succeeded, in preventing the imposition of penalties. However,
that very fact made it less likely that a law firm associated with the
promoter could be counted on to provide a fair assessment of the
likelihood that the tax shelter would successfully reduce the taxpayers’
tax liability.149

145. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex.
2007), aff’d on other grounds, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009).
146. Id. at 904-05.
147. Id. at 905.
148. Id.
149. There also are a number of other points in the opinion where one could ask whether the
court failed to apply a sufficient level of skepticism. For example, the court’s acceptance of the
taxpayers’ claims that they only discovered that the highly structured tax shelter generated
significant purported tax losses after they had completed the transaction. Id. at 893. In NPR
Investments, LLC v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Tex. 2010), the same group of
ultimate individual taxpayers plus a third partner in their law firm entered in to another, similar, tax
shelter in the subsequent year. The IRS asserted penalties and the matter was tried before the same
U.S. federal judge as had decided Klamath. The court again held for the taxpayer finding facts that
strain credulity particularly in light of facts that the court previously had found in Klamath. For
example, in Klamath, the court found that the taxpayers learned of the tax benefits from the first tax
shelter in a discussion with their accountants near the end of 2000. Klamath, 472 F. Supp. 2d at
893. Nevertheless, in NPR Investments, the court found that the taxpayers did not discuss tax
benefits in a conversation with the same accountants about the second tax shelter that occurred
sometime in 2001, but no later than the summer. NPR Invs., 732 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
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Tax Advisors that are Developers or Implementers of a Tax
Strategy

In cases where a tax advisor has developed a tax-reduction strategy,
or implements the strategy, the tax advisor in some sense is committed
to a position that the strategy is effective. The tax advisor may have
invested considerable resources in developing the strategy, or may have
committed to the taxpayer at the outset of the transaction to provide a
favorable opinion. The tax advisor also may have a financial interest in
providing a favorable opinion, either because the advisor is charging a
premium fee for the tax strategy, or because the tax advisor will receive
150
Finally, the tax
lower fees if the transaction does not complete.
advisor may be in a position to modify the relevant facts in a way that
helps support a favorable opinion. As discussed below, courts have
taken different views on how those circumstances affect the reliability of
the tax advisor’s opinion.
In American Boat, the taxpayer engaged a lawyer to restructure his
ownership of towboats following a nearly catastrophic marine
accident.151 The lawyer, who later was indicted for promoting invalid
tax shelters, had previously assisted the taxpayer by developing and
implementing an estate plan that included a highly structured tax
shelter.152 In restructuring the taxpayer’s towboat holding structure, the
lawyer again included a highly structured tax shelter, and provided an
153
The taxpayer provided the opinion to a
opinion to the taxpayer.
national accounting firm for purposes of preparing the tax returns of the
relevant entities, and the accountants informed the taxpayer both that
they considered the legal position taken in the opinion to be accurate,
and that they had implemented the same strategy for some of their other
clients and could have done the same for the taxpayer.154 The taxpayer
claimed not to know or have reason to know at the time of the
transaction that the taxpayer or the law firms with which he was

150. The fact that a tax advisor’s fee is payable only if the advisor is able to render a favorable
opinion does not in itself cause the fee to depend on the taxpayer realizing the intended tax benefits.
Therefore that fact should not cause the transaction to be a reportable transaction and subject the
opinion to the more stringent rules of I.R.C. § 6664(d) (2006) discussed above.
151. Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2009).
152. Id. at 474-75.
153. Id. at 475-76.
154. Id. at 476. The taxpayer and his companies later changed their accounting firm to a
regional firm, which raised no concern regarding the tax position taken on the relevant returns. Id.
at 477.
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associated during the course of the transaction155 had structured similar
156
Moreover, the District Court found
transactions for other taxpayers.
that, at the time of the transaction, the taxpayer had no reason to suspect
the quality of the tax opinion, and the Court of Appeals held that the
opinion met the specific requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c).157
The government argued that the taxpayer’s reliance on the opinion
was not reasonable for a number of reasons: (1) he paid a large flat fee
to the lawyer to structure the transactions, (2) the tax advice provided by
the lawyer was distinct from any advice regarding tort liability, (3) the
opinion contained representations that the taxpayer knew or should have
known were false, and (4) the transactions provided a large tax benefit
for minimal risk, which the taxpayer should have known was too good to
be true.158 The court held that the large fee paid to the lawyer was not
sufficient reason to treat the taxpayer’s reliance on the opinion as
unreasonable, and rejected the position advanced by the government that
advice is per se unreliable when the tax advisor incorporates a potential
159
The court acknowledged that in
tax shelter into a restructuring plan.
many instances, a taxpayer might be unreasonable in relying on an
advisor who stands to gain significantly from a transaction, but noted
that the flat fee covered not only the tax shelter but also significant work
restructuring the taxpayer’s various business entities in response to
liability concerns.160 The court specifically accepted the District Court’s
finding that the taxpayer did not pay the fee thinking that as
consideration he was getting a tax shelter.
The court refused to find the taxpayer’s reliance on the opinion to
be unreasonable because the tax advice from the lawyer was distinct
from any advice the lawyer may have provided regarding tort liability.
The District Court found that taxpayer had approached the lawyer to
reorganize his business to reduce potential liability, not to implement a
tax shelter, and that the shelter was never marketed to the taxpayer.161
On that basis, the Court of Appeals concluded that the lawyer’s
overarching counsel was to reorganize, and that the taxpayer relied in

155. During the course of the transaction, the lawyer moved his practice to the same J&G law
firm that appeared in Stobie Creek Investments LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2010), and New Phoenix Sunrise v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 161, 194 (2009).
156. Am. Boat, 583 F.3d at 477.
157. Id. at 485-86.
158. Id. at 484-85.
159. Id. at 483.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 485.
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part on the lawyer’s recommended means of doing so, which included
162
the tax shelter.
The court refused to accept the government’s position that the tax
opinion was unreliable in that it contained representations that the
taxpayer knew or should have known were false, particularly that the
transactions in the tax shelter had a non-tax business purpose and that
the taxpayer sought an economic profit.163 The court acknowledged that
164
the tax shelter transactions were unlikely at best to realize a profit.
However, the court accepted the District Court’s finding that the
taxpayer did not know the transactions held no profit potential, or that
specific factual assertions in the opinion were incorrect.165
Finally, the court refused to accept the government’s position that
the taxpayer’s reliance was unreasonable because the tax benefits were
too good to be true, and accordingly the taxpayer should have known
that something was awry.166 The court noted that a national accounting
firm had specifically agreed with the position and had informed the
taxpayer that it was structuring similar transactions, that the taxpayer
had engaged in a similar tax shelter transaction in connection with his
earlier estate planning that had not been challenged by the IRS, and that
the taxpayer had engaged in another tax-motivated business
reorganization.167
The conclusion to be drawn from American Boat seems to be that a
tax advisor will not be treated as providing inherently unreliable advice
merely because the advisor encourages the taxpayer to incorporate
aggressive tax planning in a legitimate business transaction, and receives
a large fee for doing so, where the taxpayer did not seek out the advisor
to reduce taxes. However, the Tax Court’s decision in Canal Corp.,168
discussed below, makes clear that a disqualifying conflict of interest
may be found even in circumstances where the tax advisor assists in
structuring and implementing a legitimate business transaction.
In Canal Corp., 169 the taxpayer engaged an investment bank and
an accounting firm with which it had a long-term relationship to jointly
develop a strategy for disposing of a business that had a fair market
value substantially in excess of its tax basis. The investment bank and
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 485-86.
Id.
See Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T. C. 199 (2010).
Id.
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accounting firm proposed a structure where the taxpayer and a party that
wanted to purchase the business would contribute their respective
businesses to a joint venture, the joint venture would borrow funds that
would be distributed to the taxpayer, and the taxpayer would provide a
170
The
limited indemnity covering the joint venture’s borrowing.
structure was intended to avoid treatment as a “disguised sale”171 and
thus defer the recognition of gain on the cash distribution to the
taxpayer. The accounting firm assisted in structuring and negotiating the
joint venture, and rendered an opinion that the cash distribution would
not be treated as a disguised sale.172 The taxpayer agreed to pay the
accounting firm an $800,000 fixed fee at the closing of the transaction,
and the taxpayer indicated that it would proceed with the transaction
only if it received a favorable tax opinion from the accounting firm.173
The court concluded that the transaction would be treated as a
disguised sale because the limited indemnity did not impose meaningful
economic risk of loss on the taxpayer, and was structured primarily to
174
The court
create an appearance of shifting risk of loss to the taxpayer.
upheld the imposition of a substantial underpayment penalty, holding
that the taxpayer had not established that it had reasonable cause, and
had acted in good faith, in claiming tax deferral.175 Specifically, the
court held that the taxpayer could not rely on the accounting firm’s
opinion to establish reasonable cause and good faith because the opinion
was based on questionable conclusions and unreasonable
assumptions,176 showed a lack of care in its preparation,177 and was
prepared by a tax advisor with inherent conflicts of interest.178
The Canal Corp. decision does not articulate a specific test for
determining when a tax advisor will have an impermissible conflict of
interest for purposes of the reasonable cause and good faith exception.
However, the case considers many of the same factors identified in 106
Ltd. as relevant to determining “promoter” status. In favor of allowing
the taxpayer to rely on the opinion were the facts that the accounting

170. See generally id.
171. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) (2006).
172. Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 205-08 (rendering of PWC Tax Opinion).
173. Id. at 206.
174. Id. at 216-17.
175. Id. at 221-22.
176. Id. at 219.
177. Id. The Court questioned how much time could have been devoted to the draft opinion
because it was littered with typographical errors, and was disorganized and incomplete.
178. Id. at 218. A professional tax advisor with a stake in the outcome has a conflict of
interest.
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firm had a long-term relationship with the taxpayer, and was engaged to
179
On the other hand, the
structure a legitimate business transaction.
accounting firm structured the transaction with an objective of reducing
taxes. The advisor helped negotiate and implement the transaction, and
made certain factual determinations to which he referred in the
opinion.180 The opinion relied on agreements with the other party to the
transaction where there was little commercial negotiation, because the
provisions were viewed as important only to supporting the taxpayer’s
tax strategy by creating the appearance of economic substance.181 The
accounting firm’s fee was a fixed amount, not calculated based on time
182
and was effectively payable only if the accounting firm was
spent,
able to render a favorable opinion because the fee was payable only on
the completion of the transaction, and the taxpayer would not close the
transaction without receiving a favorable opinion.183 The court
characterized fee as the “exorbitant price tag” for “an insurance policy as
to the taxability of the transaction.”184 More generally, the court found
185
the opinion unpersuasive and result-oriented.
Nevertheless, as other commentators also have noted, there is
something troubling about the Canal Corp. decision.186 This was not a
case where a taxpayer sought to derive benefits that it should have

179. See Bubel, supra note 11, at 844-45 (discussing cases where courts found the taxpayer’s
long-standing relationship with a tax advisor as a factor justifying the taxpayer’s reliance on the tax
advisor’s opinion).
180. Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 220 (“[w]e would be hard pressed to identify which of the hats
Mr. Miller was wearing in rendering that tax opinion. There were too many.”).
181. Id. at 221 (“[i]n essence, Mr. Miller issued an opinion on a transaction he helped plan
without the normal give-and-take in negotiating terms with an outside party.”).
182. The court expressed doubt that the fee charged reflected the amount of work involved,
noting that the opinion was “littered with typographical errors, disorganized and incomplete.” Id. at
219. The court questioned whether “any firm would have had such a cavalier approach if the firm
was being compensated solely for time devoted to rendering the opinion.” Id. Also, the court noted
that the author of the opinion failed to recognize several parts of the opinion. Id.
183. As the court noted, the accounting firm “therefore had a large stake in making sure the
closing occurred.” Id. at 221.
184. Id.
185. The court found it “unreasonable that anyone, let alone an attorney, would issue the
highest level opinion a firm offers on such dubious legal reasoning [as was contained in the
opinion].” Id. at 219. (The author of the opinion was a licensed attorney, though he was not a
practicing attorney at the time he gave the legal opinion). The court concluded that “no lesser level
of comfort would have commanded the $800,000 fixed fee that Chesapeake paid for the opinion.”
Id. at 220.
186. See Blake D. Rubin, Andrea Macintosh Whiteway & Jon G. Finkelstein, Tax Court Goes
Overboard in Canal, TAX NOTES 185, 193-95 (2011); Richard M. Lipton & Todd D. Golub, The
Tax Court Drains Canal Corporation’s Leveraged Partnership Transaction, 113 J. TAX’N 340, 35153 (2010).
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known were unrealistic. The tax planning related to a legitimate
business transaction and the tax deferral strategy, which was well known
187
was proposed by a leading
and accepted within the profession,
investment bank and a leading accounting firm. Moreover, it is
frequently the case that a tax advisor will negotiate tax-sensitive
provisions of commercial agreements, and that the other party to the
transaction will consider the provisions to have little commercial
relevance other than to ensure that the taxpayer achieves a particular tax
treatment.
Tax-deferred corporate reorganizations and like-kind
exchanges are just a few examples of transactions where minor
variations in the commercial terms can affect one party’s tax treatment
while having little commercial or tax effect on the other party.188 In a
number of recent cases where courts have criticized the participation of
tax advisors in the structuring and documentation of tax shelters, they
have distinguished situations where a legitimate business transaction is
structured to minimize taxes.189
187. See, e.g., Louis S. Freeman, Dean S. Shulman, Victor Hollender & Jeffrey A. Greenblatt,
The Partnership Union: Opportunities for Joint Ventures and Divestitures, 910 PLI/TAX 1-1
(2010); Eric B. Sloan, Steven E. Klig & Judd A. Sher, Through the Looking Glass: Seeing
Corporate Problems as Partnership Opportunities, 869 PLI/TAX 833 (2009); Lewis R. Steinberg &
Robert Willens, Hot Topics & Cutting-Edge Structures, SP051 ALI-ABA 403 (2009); Lewis R.
Steinberg, The Use of Partnerships to Dispose of Appreciated Corporate Assets, 569 PLI/TAX 1023
(2003).
188. See, e.g., DeCleene v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 457, 475-77 (1993) (reliance by taxpayer on
accountants and attorneys who structured and implemented purported like-kind exchange sufficient
to avoid penalties). See generally James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine”
in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV. 135, 155-56 (2002) (footnotes omitted):
At the other end of the spectrum are transactions that, while arguably aggressive (and
certainly imaginative), most would agree should not be branded as abusive ‘tax shelters’
although they certainly were tax savers. Seagram merely followed a published revenue
ruling, while Esmark selected the low-tax path to a given end in a situation where two
other equally plausible, thought higher taxed, alternative routes also were available; the
Service was not allowed to resequence Esmark’s transaction into the high-tax channels.
Cottage Savings’ mortgage pool swaps, while they were tax-motivated and did not result
in a meaningful change in its economic position, involved a case where recognition of an
actual accrued economic loss merely was being accelerated for tax purposes. Form has
always occupied a major role in subchapter C and will no doubt continue to do so.
Exploiting the many weaknesses in the mostly mechanical rules of subchapter C is an
old sport that is ever new. While many of these transactions are tax-driven (even
predominantly so), they probably do not deserve to be stigmatized as abusive tax
shelters.
189. See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“Jeffrey Welles sought out and selected the J&G strategy because of a desire to avoid taxes that
would otherwise be owed on the Therma-Tru deal, not because he wanted to structure the deal itself
to minimize taxes”); 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 67, 80 (2011) (“[o]ne might need to be careful
in applying the definition to some kinds of transactions–a tax lawyer asked by a businessman for
advice on how to sell the family business through a tax-favored stock redemption might be said to
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In Canal Corp., the court did not state that a taxpayer may never
rely on the opinion of a tax advisor who has participated in structuring
and negotiating the relevant transaction, but instead criticized the
manner in which the transaction was structured, the manner in which the
tax advisor developed the facts on which the opinion was based, and the
legal reasoning underlying the opinion.190 The court’s criticisms largely
concerned the manner in which the tax advisor approached the question
of how much assets the obligor under the indemnity should retain to
avoid disguised sale treatment. The tax advisor had recommended that
the obligor maintain at least 20% of its maximum exposure under the
indemnity.191 Although the taxpayer followed that advice for as long as
the indemnity was outstanding, the court concluded that the opinion was
based on unreasonable assumptions because no agreement with the other
party to the transaction required the obligor under the indemnity to
maintain a specified level of assets or net worth.192
The court also criticized the fact that the advisor assumed that the
indemnity would be effective, and that the entity granting the indemnity
would hold sufficient assets to permit the liabilities covered by the
indemnity to be allocated to the taxpayer.193 The court concluded that
the factual analysis in the opinion was tainted by the advisor’s “audit” of
the assets of the joint venture and the entity granting the indemnity, and
by the fact that the tax advisor made legal assumptions separate from the
tax assumptions in the opinion and reviewed state law to make sure the
assumptions were valid regarding whether a partnership was formed.194
The court faulted the legal analysis in the opinion that the
indemnity would have substance if the entity maintained assets of at
have ‘participated in structuring the transaction’–but when the transaction involved is the same tax
shelter offered to numerous parties, the definition is workable.”). Cf. Am. Boat Co. v. United
States, 583 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2009):
Mayer received a flat fee for his services–which, importantly, included not only an
impermissible transaction, but also significant work restructuring Jump’s various
business entities in response to concerns about his companies’ liability. To accept the
government’s argument would mean that a taxpayer may never rely upon the legal
advice of the same adviser who counsels the individual on restructuring . . . Jump’s
reliance on Mayer’s advice was not per se unreasonable simply because he also advised
Jump on restructuring his business.
190. Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T. C. 199 (2010).
191. Id. at 206.
192. The court considered the fact that the taxpayer extracted assets from the entity in the year
that the joint venture terminated as indicating that the arrangements to maintain assets in the entity
“served to create merely the appearance, rather than the reality, of economic risk for a portion of the
LLC debt.” Id. at 214.
193. Id. at 220.
194. Id. at 221.
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least 20% of the maximum exposure. Specifically, the court determined
that the advisor should not have relied by analogy, in the absence of case
law or Code authority, on an obsolete revenue procedure that set forth
guidelines under which the IRS would provide a ruling on a different
issue, and characterized such conclusions as faulty “legal assumptions”
that made the opinion unreliable for penalty protection purposes.195 The
court found it objectionable that the advisor was willing to render a
“should” level opinion, which was the highest level of opinion that the
accounting firm offered to its clients, and which reflected a position that
was materially higher than a “more likely than not” opinion.196
It is difficult to see how any of the court’s criticisms described
above are a basis for denying the taxpayer the ability to rely on the tax
advisor’s opinion. The absence of a contractual obligation to maintain a
minimum level of assets to support the indemnity does not alter the fact
that the obligor in fact maintained the recommended amount of assets at
all relevant times.197 The taxpayer clearly understood and accepted that
maintaining assets in the entity was necessary to achieve the desired tax
treatment, and there is no indication that the taxpayer intended to shield
those assets from any liability that might arise under the indemnity.198
Likewise, there was no indication that the tax advisor’s factual or
non-tax legal assumptions per se were incorrect. The court’s decision
contains no suggestion, for example, that the indemnity was legally
ineffective or that the taxpayer would not maintain assets of at least 20%
195. Id. at 219. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 2003-99,
2003-2 C.B. 388, stated that the IRS generally would rule that an organization lacked limited
liability for purposes of determining partnership status under prior regulations, if the net worth of
the corporate general partner equaled at least 10% of the total contributions to the limited
partnership and was expected to continue to equal at least 10% throughout the life of the
partnership.
196. Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 219.
197. Without an obligation to maintain assets in the entity, the taxpayer had the opportunity to
extract assets in the event that facts indicated the indemnity would be called upon. No such event
occurred, and the court recognized that such a move would create a potential cause of action for
fraudulent conveyance. Id. at 216. The court viewed the potential for such a claim as insufficient to
create economic risk of loss; however the court did not directly address the fact that a fraudulent
conveyance action could interfere with a move, if there were signs of trouble, to extract the assets
that it voluntarily maintained in the entity.
198. One commentator has questioned whether there is legal authority to support the position
that voluntarily maintaining assets is sufficient. Michael L. Schler, Questions About the Canal
Case, 130 TAX NOTES 971 (2011). However, assuming that no authority existed either way at the
time the opinion was rendered, and that the taxpayer did in fact intend to maintain assets for so long
as the indemnity was outstanding, it seems reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on the opinion of the
tax advisor that assets maintained voluntarily are sufficient to create economic substance. Although
others may disagree, this does not appear to be the type of conclusion that even a sophisticated
taxpayer should have considered “too good to be true.”
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of the maximum exposure under the indemnity.199 The court’s criticism
of the tax advisor’s actions to verify certain facts and non-tax legal
conclusions is particularly difficult to fathom. The facts in question
included financial facts and conclusions under relevant state law. There
is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the tax advisor, who was a
partner in an accounting firm and a licensed attorney, did not have the
necessary expertise and institutional resources to review those facts and
legal conclusions.
The regulations regarding reliance on an opinion to avoid penalties
specifically state that “[t]he advice must be based upon all pertinent facts
and circumstances and the law as it relates to those facts and
circumstances,”200 and “must not be based on unreasonable factual or
legal assumptions . . . and must not unreasonably rely on the
representations, statements, findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or
any other person.”201 If anything, those standards require the tax advisor
to consider the veracity and plausibility of the factual material on which
the opinion is based, to make relevant inquiries and to draw appropriate
conclusions. This approach is consistent with the ethical and regulatory
requirements imposed directly on practitioners.202 Needless to say, an
opinion may involve factual issues in which the tax advisor does not
have the necessary competence, and must rely on experts. However, the
implication in the court’s decision that all factual assumptions must be

199. The court characterizes the opinion as making the factual assumption that the entity
“would hold assets sufficient to avoid the anti-abuse rule.” However, the description of the opinion
strongly suggests that it did not “assume away the very crux of whether the transaction would
qualify as a nontaxable contribution to a partnership.” Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 220. Rather, as far
as can be gathered from the court’s decision, the opinion appears to have made a factual assumption
that the entity would maintain assets of at least 20% of the maximum exposure under the indemnity,
and concluded based on the analogy to the revenue procedure and the regulatory interpretation
discussed above, that such assets would be sufficient.
200. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2003).
201. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii).
202. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(d) (2011):
[a] practitioner advising a client to take a position on a tax return . . . generally may rely
in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the client. The
practitioner may not, however, ignore the implications of information furnished to, or
actually known by, the practitioner, and must make reasonable inquiries if the
information as furnished appears to be incorrect, inconsistent with an important fact or
another factual assumption, or incomplete
31 C.F.R. § 10.37(a) (2011):
[a] practitioner must not give written advice . . . concerning one or more Federal tax
issues if the practitioner bases the written advice on unreasonable factual or legal
assumptions . . . unreasonably relies upon representations, statements, findings or
agreements of the taxpayer or any other person, [or] does not consider all relevant facts
that the practitioner knows or should know . . . .
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independently validated appears nowhere in the relevant regulations, and
as a per se rule would do little to ensure the reliability of opinions.
The court’s criticisms of the tax advisor’s legal analysis are faulty
in two regards. Most importantly, it is well established that a court may
not deny a taxpayer the ability to rely on a legal opinion of a qualified
advisor merely because it disagrees with the analysis in the opinion,
assuming that the taxpayer itself does not know or have reason to know
that the analysis is faulty or “too good to be true.”203 The court
therefore was not justified in disqualifying the opinion by characterizing
the tax advisor’s legal conclusions as faulty “legal assumptions.”204 As
is frequently the case, there was no directly applicable authority and the
tax advisor was required to reach his conclusions by relying on
analogous authority and by extrapolating from postulates given in the
205
To all appearances, the tax advisor reached the legal
regulations.
conclusions in the opinion based on the guidance that he thought was

203. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985):
[w]hen an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as
whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice. Most
taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an accountant or
attorney. To require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney, to seek a ‘second opinion,’
or to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very
purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place. . . . ‘Ordinary
business care and prudence’ does not demand such actions.
204. In Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 210 (D. Conn.
2004), aff’d 150 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2005), the court similarly characterized legal conclusions
with which it disagreed as “legal assumptions.” See also Bubel, supra note 11, at 871:
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii) includes a proscription against unreasonable legal
assumptions. While not explicitly requiring citations to legal authority in the same
jurisdiction, it would seem to be somewhat difficult to meet this requirement by ignoring
relevant authority within the jurisdiction if it bears directly on the facts at hand.
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Long Term Capital Holdings concluded that the District Court had
faulted the inadequate legal analysis because it demonstrated that the opinion was based on “flawed
and outcome-determinative assumptions Long-Term asked it to make,” and “not because it expected
Long-Term to engage in sophisticated questioning of its expert advice.” Long Term Capital
Holdings, 150 Fed. Appx. at 43 n.1. See Prescott, supra note 8, at 1009 (discussing the Second
Circuit opinion).
205. See, e.g., Lawsky, supra note 11, at 1037-38 (noting that the determination whether a
technically compliant transaction violates the substance or intent of the law ultimately can only be
made by a court and therefore cannot be predicted with certainty by a tax advisor).
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most relevant.206 The regulations specifically contemplate this type of
207
analysis.
Moreover, the court’s conclusion that the taxpayer’s position “did
not warrant a ‘should’ opinion” is irrelevant because it tests the opinion
against a higher standard than the “more likely than not” standard called
for in the applicable regulations.208 Finally, it is doubtful that any better
judgment would have been reached by requiring the taxpayer to review
the analogous authority (or find its own analogy). Specifically, it is
doubtful that a taxpayer knowing the need to leave assets in the entity
granting the indemnity, and that there was a very low probability of the
indemnity being called upon, would conclude that the tax law required
the assets to be more than 20% of the maximum exposure under the
indemnity.209 Likewise, it is doubtful that a taxpayer intending to leave
assets in the entity, and knowing it could be exposed to a fraudulent
conveyance claim if it extracted the assets when there were signs of
trouble, would conclude that the tax law required it also to commit in the
210
indemnity to maintain those assets.
The court’s conclusions about the fee arrangements in Canal Corp.
also are unpersuasive. The court levied three main criticisms: first, the
accounting firm charged a high fee for what the court viewed to be a low

206. The court criticized the use of the words “it appears” in the opinion’s interpretation of the
relevant regulation. Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T. C. 199, 220 (2010). The court appears to have
interpreted those words as an abdication of responsibility by the tax advisor for the legal conclusion,
but more likely they were an honest expression that the tax advisor reached the conclusions without
directly applicable authority, and that other conclusions were possible.
207. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (2011) (“[t]there may be substantial authority
for the treatment of an item despite the absence of certain types of authority. Thus, a taxpayer may
have substantial authority for a position that is supported only by a well-reasoned construction of
the applicable statutory provision.”).
208. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(i)(B) (2011). Canal Corp. is not the first case where a court
objected to the willingness of a tax advisor to provide a “should” opinion that it disagreed with. See
Long Term Capital Holdings, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 210-11:
Finally, no other evidence such as companion memoranda discussing the application of
[various relevant authorities] to the actual facts of the OTC transaction was offered to
show research for King & Spalding’s legal analysis and opinions. Such background
research does not involve obscure or inaccessible caselaw references, is basic to a sound
legal product, especially for [a] ‘should’ legal opinion and a premium of $400,000. With
hourly billing totals exceeding $100,000 there could hot have been research time
constraints.
209. A financially sophisticated taxpayer would likely discount the maximum exposure by the
probability of the indemnity being called upon, similar to the analysis used by insurance companies
to establish reserves.
210. Many business and financial transactions involving long-term commitments do not
specify the assets that the party giving the commitment must maintain.
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quality work product.211 Second, the fee was not based on the time
212
Third, the fee was
spent by the accounting firm on the transaction.
effectively payable only if the accounting firm was able to render the
opinion.213
On the first point, the court’s decision strongly implies that the only
reason the accounting firm was willing to render an opinion at a
“should” level was because it was receiving an $800,000 fee. As the
court put it: “PWC crossed over the line from trusted adviser for prior
accounting purposes to advocate for a position with no authority that
was based on an opinion with a high price tag—$800,000.”214
This characterization implies that the accounting firm engaged in
high priced prostitution, but there is nothing in the court’s decision that
convincingly establishes that the accounting firm did not believe the
conclusions in its opinion. The court appears to base its characterization
primarily on the fact that when the advisor was asked how the
accounting firm could issue a “should” opinion if no authority on point
existed to support the position taken in the opinion, he “demurred that it
was what Chesapeake requested.”215 From that response, the court
extrapolated that “no lesser level of comfort would have commanded the
216
However,
$800,000 fixed fee that Chesapeake paid for the opinion.”
a conclusion that the taxpayer would not have been willing to pay for a
weaker opinion does not necessarily mean that the amount of the fee
influenced the accounting firm’s belief in its opinion.217
The court characterizes the second and third points as two sides of a
metaphorical coin:

211. Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T. C. 199, 219 (2010) (noting the opinion, which was in draft
form, was littered with typographical errors, disorganized and incomplete).
212. Id. An $800,000 flat fee for the opinion was issued which was not based on time devoted
to preparation of the opinion.
213. Id. The flat fee was to be paid for the opinion, thus, in order to receive the fee, the
opinion had to be completed.
214. Id. at 220. See also Bemont Invs., LLC v. United States, Nos. 4:07cv9, 4:07cv10, 2010
WL 3057437, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010) (“[t]he Court believes that Coscia was no more than
a ‘puppet’ for Plaintiffs and rendered no real independent or objective advice. Coscia said what he
was paid to say.”).
215. Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 219.
216. Id. at 220.
217. The court notes that the opinion, which was in draft form, was littered with typographical
errors, disorganized, and incomplete, and that the author of the opinion failed to recognize several
parts of the opinion. Those facts suggest a level of sloppiness that has no place in a top-tier
accounting firm. However, they do not in themselves suggest that the accounting firm did not
believe the conclusions in the opinion.
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We also find suspect the exorbitant price tag associated with the sole
condition of closing. Chesapeake essentially bought an insurance
policy as to the taxability of the transaction. PWC received an
$800,000 fixed fee for its tax opinion. PWC did not base its fee on an
hourly rate plus expenses. The fee was payable and contingent on the
closing of the joint venture transaction. PWC would receive payment
only if it issued Chesapeake a “should” opinion on the joint venture
transaction. PWC therefore had a large stake in making sure the
closing occurred.

Considering all the facts and circumstances, PWC’s opinion looks
more like a quid pro quo arrangement than a true tax advisory
opinion.218
This may have been the case, but there is another possible, and less
venal, explanation of the billing arrangement that was not addressed by
the court.219 As the court found, the taxpayer concluded that a taxable
sale of the business would not be advantageous, and therefore engaged
the investment bank and the accounting firm to develop “strategic
alternatives” for the business.220 The investment bank recommended to
the taxpayer’s management that the best alternative for maximizing
shareholder value would be a leveraged partnership structure with the
other party to the transaction.221 The taxpayer’s board liked the
leveraged partnership idea, but the taxpayer made clear to the investment
bank and to the accounting firm that it would only approve a nontaxable
transaction.222 Moreover, the taxpayer made clear that it would only
approve the transaction if the accounting firm rendered a “should” level
opinion, presumably because the taxpayer wanted assurance that the
transaction presented a low level of tax risk.223
The taxpayer and the accounting firm also agreed to a billing
arrangement under which the accounting firm would bill the taxpayer at
the close of the transaction.224 Presumably, this condition was requested
by the taxpayer, not the accounting firm, which took the risk that the
218. Id. at 221.
219. Some commentators have argued that the court’s conclusion that the accounting firm
would be paid nothing if the transaction did not close was not supported by the record. Lipton &
Golub, supra note 186, at 352. Based on personal experience, it seems doubtful that an accounting
firm would agree to take the entire risk of working for nothing if the transaction does not close;
however, the remaining discussion assumes that the court’s characterization of the fee arrangement
is correct.
220. Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 203.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 204.
223. Id. at 205.
224. Id. at 206.
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transaction would not close for any number of possible reasons, such as
the failure of the parties to reach a commercial agreement, the failure to
receive antitrust clearances, etc. For the taxpayer, the accounting firm’s
work would be worthless unless the transaction closed, and the
accounting firm was willing to accept the financial risk of its work being
worthless. The accounting firm recognized that its ability to render a
“should” level opinion was one condition to the closing, but presumably
the accounting firm had concluded that it would be able to render such
an opinion.225 However, the accounting firm knew that the transaction
would require a large amount of work,226 and wanted to receive a
premium for taking the risk that the transaction would not close for
reasons unrelated to its ability to render a “should” level opinion.
Needless to say, it is impossible as outsiders to know exactly what
went through the minds of the taxpayer and the accounting firm as they
negotiated the billing arrangement. However, given the severe reproach
levied by the court, one would have hoped for it to first address more
innocent explanations.
Looking past the specific faults identified by the court, the Canal
Corp. decision seems to reflect the view that a sophisticated taxpayer
that arranges its affairs to take a knowingly aggressive position, and that
pays a tax advisor to develop an opinion that supports the position,
should not be entitled to rely on the opinion to avoid penalties.
Knowing that the position is aggressive, the taxpayer already has
accepted the possibility that taxes may not be avoided, and the opinion
thus serves merely to shield the taxpayer from penalties. Effectively,
there is a range of possible legal conclusions regarding the taxpayer’s
position, falling on either side of the line. The advisor’s judgment that
the position is more likely to be correct than incorrect should be
discounted because the advisor is being paid to reach that conclusion.
Under this view, a sophisticated taxpayer should not be able to rely on

225. As discussed above, the leveraged partnership tax deferral strategy was well known and
accepted within the tax profession.
226. The court was skeptical of the tax advisor’s testimony that he and his team “spent hours
on the opinion,” because the opinion was “littered with typographical errors, disorganized and
incomplete.” Id. at 219. However, it is clear that the tax advisor and his team spent a large amount
of time on the transaction as a whole. As noted by the court, they helped the investment bank
develop a recommended strategy, were “intricately involved in drafting the joint venture agreement,
the operating agreement and the indemnity agreement,” reviewed the assets of the joint venture and
the entity providing the indemnity, researched state law points, and researched and drafted the
opinion. Id. at 221. In drafting the transaction documents, the tax advisor coordinated closely with
the taxpayer’s management in considering the circumstances in which the taxpayer would be called
upon to pay the indemnity.
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an opinion to avoid penalties on a position the taxpayer has arranged to
take unless objectively there is little likelihood that the position is
227
incorrect.
There are two fundamental problems with this view. First, it favors
tax positions where the taxpayer has not altered its behavior in order to
take the position. Not only does this discourage candor on the part of
taxpayers about their motivations, it is not clear that tax planning should
be discouraged. By enacting rules that tax certain behaviors less than
others, Congress has effectively expressed a judgment that the lowertaxed behaviors are socially desirable.228
Second, the view effectively disqualifies a judgment by a tax
advisor that under the regulations would be acceptable if made directly
by the taxpayer. All that the regulations require of a taxpayer making its
own analysis is that its position have substantial authority and that it
“reasonably conclude in good faith” that the position is more likely to be
correct than incorrect based on the pertinent facts and authorities, and
weighing the authorities based on their relevance, persuasiveness, and
authoritativeness.229 Reasonableness and good faith do not require the
taxpayer to avoid reporting a position unless there is a minimal level of
risk that the position will be incorrect. Rather, the reasonableness and
good faith standard require the taxpayer to evaluate its position in a
manner that is objectively reasonable, and to believe its analysis.230
Obviously, the fact that the taxpayer has a self-interest in paying
less tax does not disqualify its evaluation, because the regulations
specifically contemplate that the taxpayer makes the evaluation.
Accordingly, the regulations permit a taxpayer to take its own selfinterest into account in asserting a position that is barely more likely to
be correct than to be incorrect. However, the regulations do not permit
the taxpayer to take its own interest into account in weighing the
probability that the position is correct.231
The standard should be no more stringent when the taxpayer pays a
tax advisor to undertake the analysis. The tax advisor has a financial
interest in reaching a favorable conclusion where there is a range of
227. For a proposal along these lines, see Doran, supra note 11, at 154-56.
228. Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible
Solutions, And a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 384-87 (2002).
229. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6664-4(f)(2)(i)(A), (B)(1) (as amended in 2003).
230. See Bubel, supra note 11, at 832-35 (discussing the factors taken into account in
evaluating good faith and reasonableness).
231. See Lawsky, supra note 11, at 1059 (“the government also wants the taxpayer to make a
‘reasonable’ judgment–that is, it wants the taxpayer to judge and report her own chances of success
in the same way that a non-self-interested person would judge and report those chances.”).
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objectively reasonable outcomes, but that financial interest merely
reflects the taxpayer’s own financial interest in paying less tax. As
discussed above, the taxpayer’s financial interest will be present any
time that the taxpayer makes its own assessment of a position, and the
regulations implicitly accept that fact, just as they implicitly accept the
fact that a “professional tax advisor” will be paid by the taxpayer.232
Given the training received by tax professionals and the professional
standards to which they are subject, there is little reason to believe that
tax advisors overall are more likely to skew their analysis than taxpayers
with an equivalent level of tax sophistication.233
It may be argued that sophisticated taxpayers engaging in
aggressive tax planning should not be able to rely on opinions of paid
advisors, because they will be able to find compliant advisors who
approve positions that a reasonable analysis would indicate are less
likely to be correct than incorrect. That concern largely is addressed by
the requirement that the taxpayer’s reliance on an opinion be reasonable
and undertaken in good faith. If the taxpayer itself has not undertaken
an analysis of the position, the regulations do not ask the court to
consider whether a reasonable taxpayer would reach the same position as
the tax advisor, beyond the general requirement that the position not be
“too good to be true.”
IV. DEVELOPING A METHOD FOR ANALYZING A TAX ADVISOR’S
OBJECTIVENESS
Ultimately, the goal of any method for evaluating potential
conflicts of interest should be to illuminate the extent of the taxpayer’s
efforts to assess its proper tax liability through reasonable reliance on a
tax advisor’s opinion that is undertaken in good faith. As the cases
discussed above have demonstrated, it is possible for an advisor to have
a conflict of interest but for a taxpayer to act reasonably and in good
faith in relying on the advisor’s opinion. Therefore, a per se rule is not
appropriate. Rather, it is necessary to develop a method for evaluating
the reasonableness of the taxpayer’s belief that the opinion was reliable,
and whether the taxpayer held that belief in good faith.
A contrary view would assert the prophylactic benefit of a per se
rule. Under that view, a taxpayer should seek alternative advice if it is

232. See Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2009) (“one in need of
legal advice almost always has to pay something for it.”).
233. As the cases discussed above demonstrate, examples of misconduct can be found on the
part of both tax advisors and taxpayers. That inevitably is the case in any large population.
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aware of a conflict of interest, because that the taxpayer is not in a
position to judge the merits of the conflicted tax advisor’s opinion.
However, there are five principal problems with that argument. First,
conflicts of interest are inevitable whenever a paid tax advisor is
involved. Even in a strict paradigm where the taxpayer approaches the
tax advisor to furnish a neutral view of the legitimacy of a structure,
such as that proposed by the court in 106 Ltd., a paid preparer will have
temptations to find the arguments that support the tax reduction potential
of a structure. As discussed above, the fact that an advisor is
compensated by the taxpayer is implicit in the regulatory structure.
Second, there is little basis to distinguish “acceptable” and
“unacceptable” conflicts of interest beyond platitudes and anecdotes.
Consider, for example, the paradigm articulated in 106 Ltd. Why should
we believe that a tax advisor is significantly more likely to distort his
advice merely because he has been engaged for the first time by the
taxpayer, because he has alerted the client of the need for tax advice,
because he has made factual inquiries outside his specific tax expertise,
because his advice differs in some fashion from his typical practice, or
because he charges a fee that is not based on his regular hourly rate?
Even if these factors may have some association with aggressive tax
planning, there are many situations where tax advisors have acted
responsibly in the presence of one or more such factors. Conversely, the
cases above demonstrate that the potential for distorted advice exists
even where, for example, the tax advisor has a long-term continual
relationship with the taxpayer.
Third, a paradigm such as that articulated in 106 Ltd. is unlikely to
reflect the day-to-day relationships of many taxpayers and their tax
advisors, and therefore become a trap for the unwary. For example,
many taxpayers lack a long-term and continual relationship with any tax
advisor, and many others have a long-term and continual relationship
only with a relatively unsophisticated tax return preparer. Therefore, on
complex matters, they either will be compelled to seek out a new tax
advisor, or will be well advised to do so. Likewise, many taxpayers rely
on their tax advisors to alert them when tax advice is appropriate, or will
seek out a tax advisor specifically to develop a strategy for reducing
taxes. Many taxpayers will encourage their tax advisors to make
judgments that go beyond the technical tax rules but that may affect the
tax analysis of a particular transaction. Finally, many taxpayers find
hourly billing arrangements undesirable because the fees are not
connected to the taxpayer’s own business success or failure, and because
the amount of time an advisor will spend often is difficult to control.
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Fourth, the notion of a per se test is inconsistent with the analysis
required under the relevant regulations. The regulations do impose some
conditions on the opinion that may be viewed as per se requirements:
the advice must be based upon all pertinent facts and circumstances and
the law as it relates to those facts and circumstances. The advice must
take into account the taxpayer’s purposes (and the relative weight of
such purposes) for entering into a transaction and for structuring it in a
particular manner. The advice must not be based on unreasonable
factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future events)
and must not unreasonably rely on the representations, statements,
findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person. In the case
of a tax shelter item of a corporation, there must be substantial authority
for the position, and the opinion must unambiguously state that the tax
advisor concludes that there is a greater than 50% likelihood that the tax
treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by the IRS. However,
beyond those specific requirements, the regulation makes clear that “[a]ll
facts and circumstances must be taken into account in determining
whether a taxpayer has reasonably relied in good faith on advice . . .
.”234
More generally, the regulations determine reasonableness and good
faith from the perspective of the taxpayer, not the advisor. Thus, for
example, the regulations note that “the taxpayer’s education,
sophistication and business experience will be relevant in determining
whether the taxpayer’s reliance on tax advice was reasonable and made
in good faith.”235 Likewise, in the case of a tax shelter item of a
corporation, the “belief requirement” is satisfied only if, based on all
facts and circumstances, “the corporation reasonably believed, at the
time the return was filed, that the tax treatment of the item was more
236
Consistent with that approach,
likely than not the proper treatment.”
the regulations frequently refer to facts that a taxpayer knew, or
reasonably should have known.237 In other words, the purpose of the
analysis is not to render judgment on the advisor’s behavior, but to

234. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (as amended in 2003).
235. Id.
236. Id. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(i)(B).
237. See id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (“reliance may not be reasonable or in good faith if the taxpayer
knew, or reasonably should have known, that the advisor lacked knowledge in the relevant aspects
of Federal tax law”); Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (“the requirements of this paragraph (c)(1) are not
satisfied if the taxpayer fails to disclose a fact that it knows, or reasonably should know, to be
relevant to the proper tax treatment of an item”); Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii) (“the advice must not be
based upon a representation or assumption which the taxpayer knows, or has reason to know, is
unlikely to be true.”).
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assess whether the taxpayer made a reasonable and good faith attempt to
238
report its proper tax liability.
Finally, the presence of a statutory per se rule for reportable
transaction understatement penalties strongly suggests that no such rule
should exist for other types of understatement penalties. As discussed
above, section 6664(d)(4)(B) of the Code provides that an opinion of a
tax advisor may not be relied upon to establish the reasonable belief of a
taxpayer in respect of a reportable transaction if the tax advisor is a
“disqualified tax advisor,” which it defines as a tax advisor having
certain types of involvement with the transaction, certain compensation
arrangements, or certain financial interests with respect to the
transaction.239 The legislative history to this provision clearly indicates
that it imposed “more meaningful” and “strengthened” test compared to
240
the general standard for reliance on opinions.
In the absence of a per se rule, an advisor’s conflict of interest must
be evaluated as a fact and circumstance in determining whether the
taxpayer has acted reasonably and in good faith. It first is necessary to
consider whether the conflict of interest is relevant to this determination.
If so, it is necessary to consider what it reveals about the taxpayer’s
efforts to determine its proper tax liability.
A.

Relevance of a Conflict of Interest

Assume that a tax advisor has a large conflict of interest. Are there
circumstances where the taxpayer should be permitted to rely on what
turns out to be an incorrect opinion from the tax advisor because the
conflict is irrelevant?
One possible circumstance is where the taxpayer is unaware of, and
has no reason to know of, the tax advisor’s conflict of interest. For
example, assume that the tax shelter promoter learns of the identity of
the tax advisor, who was independently selected by the taxpayer, and
refers another client to the advisor with the hope of influencing the
advisor’s analysis. The advisor accepts the referral and fails to disclose
it to the taxpayer. One way of analyzing this situation is to ask whether

238. There are various other fora for determining for evaluating a tax advisor’s behavior,
including, for example, disciplinary actions under Circular 230 by the Treasury Department Office
of Professional Responsibility, State ethics proceedings, the imposition of tax return preparer
penalties under I.R.C. § 6694, malpractice actions, and actions to enforce the securities laws. See
generally DAVID T. MOLDENHAUER, TAX OPINIONS IN LEGAL OPINION LETTERS, A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO OPINION LETTER PRACTICE (M. John Sterba ed., 3d ed. 2010).
239. See supra Part II.
240. H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 263 (2004).
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the taxpayer or the government should bear any consequences of the tax
advisor’s undisclosed conflict of interest, assuming that the opinion
otherwise meets the regulatory requirements. However, because the
issue does not concern the taxpayer’s substantive tax liability, but rather
the imposition of penalties, this type of “zero sum” analysis should not
apply. Rather, the issue should be determined based on the purpose of
the reasonable cause and good faith exception, which looks to the
taxpayer’s state of mind and behavior. If the taxpayer has been vigilant
in selecting and instructing the tax advisor, there is little reason to deny
penalty relief because of the tax advisor’s own potential misbehavior.
A second possible circumstance is where the conflicted tax advisor
has rendered an opinion that demonstrably is equivalent to the opinion
that would be rendered by a more independent advisor. Imagine, for
example, a case where the tax advisor promotes a common tax credit
strategy in exchange for a portion of the tax savings, and where the
relevant legal issue has been decided favorably to taxpayers by the
relevant circuit court of appeals, but there is a split with another circuit
court of appeals that decided adversely to taxpayers. The taxpayer has
made no separate analysis. If the opinion is rendered and the tax return
is filed before the Supreme Court grants certiorari to decide the circuit
split, and if more independent advisors have rendered equivalent
opinions, it would seem unfair to deny the taxpayer penalty relief
because of the tax advisor’s posture as a marketer and implementer of
the transaction, or because the tax advisor is paid a portion of the tax
savings. Given the low probability of the Supreme Court granting
certiorari on any issue, there is little reason to impute to the tax advisor a
willful blindness to the possibility that the circuit court of appeals
decision could not be relied upon.
Should a conflict be deemed irrelevant because the circumstances
under which the conflict arose are not directly related to the flaw in the
transaction? For example, assume that a tax advisor develops a tax
reduction strategy that would be effective if it were properly
implemented, but for reasons unrelated to the tax advisor, and unknown
to the tax advisor, the implementation is flawed. If the test of relevance
is whether the opinion demonstrably is equivalent to the opinion that
would be rendered by a more independent advisor, the fact that the tax
advisor is unconnected with the implementation may not be sufficient to
ignore the conflict of interest. For example, a more independent tax
advisor might have reviewed more carefully the implementation of the
strategy.
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When a Conflict of Interest is Relevant

In many situations, the conflict of interest will be relevant and the
inquiry becomes what the conflict of interest reveals about the
taxpayer’s efforts to determine its proper tax liability. Two variables
seem relevant for this analysis: (1) the inducement that an apparent
conflict may create to distort the advice (“temptation”),241 and (2) the
advisor’s apparent response to such inducement (“resistance”).
Applying those two variables creates a framework for analysis.
Assuming the other requirements of the regulations are satisfied, a
taxpayer can reasonably and in good faith rely on an opinion rendered by
an advisor subject to a low level of apparent temptation, and who
appears to act with a proper level of resistance. Conversely, a taxpayer
should not be permitted to rely on an opinion where there is a high level
of apparent temptation, and little indication that the advisor is resisting
the temptation to distort the advice in favor of tax reduction.
The more interesting cases arise where either the level of apparent
temptation is high, but the level of apparent resistance also is high, or
where the level of apparent temptation is low, but the level of apparent
resistance also is low. Assume, for example, that in Canal Corp. the
record showed that the taxpayer knew that the accounting firm’s opinion
committee had approved the opinion after an intense review of the facts
and applicable law, and that no member of that committee was aware of
the billing arrangements. In that case, the fact that the accounting firm
had a financial incentive to render a favorable opinion, and that it
arguably colluded in producing the facts on which it based the opinion,
should not prevent the taxpayer from relying on the opinion. To all
appearances, the financial incentive had been resisted, and as discussed
above, it is common for tax practitioners to participate in shaping
business transactions to achieve legitimate tax reductions. Under those
facts, to deny the taxpayer the ability to rely on the opinion because of
the accounting firm’s financial incentive and its involvement in the
transaction would effectively apply an impermissible per se rule.
Now assume that a taxpayer with no tax expertise asks its long-time
advisor at a respected firm to review a tax shelter that the taxpayer was
offered. The firm has no relationship with the promoter, has not
promoted similar strategies, and will be paid hourly rates for its review.
The advisor inquires into the relevant facts, but does not participate in
241. As discussed above, if the temptation is not apparent, it is doubtful that the conflict of
interest should be considered relevant in determining whether the taxpayer acted reasonably and in
good faith in relying on the tax advisor’s opinion.
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shaping the facts. The opinion that the advisor renders accurately sets
for the relevant facts and does not contain any unreasonable
assumptions, because among other things it acknowledges the taxpayer’s
primary motivation to reduce taxes. The taxpayer and the advisor have a
friendly relationship, and when the taxpayer first approaches the advisor
and describes the shelter, the advisor says “I think I can get there.” The
advisor spends a considerable amount of time developing an opinion that
describes all the facts and issues, but relies on minor factual distinctions
and outdated and marginal cases to reach a favorable conclusion. The
advisor knows—but does not tell the taxpayer—that the transaction is
unlikely to be sustained, but he figures the chances of audit are low.
In this example, the level of apparent temptation is low, specifically
the advisor’s personal desire to accommodate the taxpayer, and
presumably to receive future work. However, certain facts in retrospect
indicate that the advisor was not resisting the temptation. Specifically,
the advisor’s quick response that he thought he could “get there,” and his
considerable effort to do so. A court reviewing the opinion will quickly
recognize its flaws; however, as the Supreme Court recognized in Boyle,
the taxpayer is not competent to discern those flaws.242 For the same
reason, it seems inappropriate to expect the taxpayer to second-guess
either the fact that the advisor was quick to indicate that he could reach a
favorable result, or the fact that he spent substantial time to do what he
quickly said he could do. Although the taxpayer may realize that the
issue is more difficult than it first appeared to the advisor, ultimately the
advisor stands in a position of apparent authority vis à vis the taxpayer.
As the Supreme Court stated in Boyle, “[t]o require the taxpayer to
challenge the attorney, to seek a ‘second opinion,’ or to try to monitor
counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very
purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place.”243
One can imagine other cases where the advisor more obviously
succumbs to a low level of temptation. Imagine, for example, that in the
initial conversation the advisor says “I normally wouldn’t do this, but I
think I can get there for you.” At that point, the taxpayer reasonably

242. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985).
243. Id.; see also Bubel, supra note 11, at 846:
[r]easonable reliance does not require a taxpayer to monitor and second-guess the efforts
of the practitioners on whom she is relying with respect to an area of the tax law that is
beyond her understanding. Rather, the taxpayer is expected to exercise ‘ordinary
business care and prudence’ in selecting a [sic] an advisor with sufficient expertise to
justify reliance (and in seeing to it that the advisor is provided with adequate
information).
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should inquire further, and if the statement is what it appears to be,
should decline the offer.
Needless to say, between these four poles (high temptation and high
resistance, high temptation and low resistance, low temptation and high
resistance, and low temptation and low resistance), there is an infinite
number of potential intermediate positions. However, identifying the
factors that create apparent temptation for a tax advisor to skew his
advice, and evaluating the advisor’s apparent resistance to that
temptation, creates a framework for courts to consider whether a
taxpayer should have been skeptical of the advice.
C.

Forms of Temptation

In considering how the foregoing framework might apply, it is
useful to identify some common forms of temptation that tax advisors
have faced when advising on tax-motivated transactions. In the cases
discussed above, the tax advisors appear to have been motivated by the
following types of temptations:
• An opportunity to earn a large fee without necessarily spending a
corresponding amount of working hours;
• An opportunity to build or maintain a practice and a track record;
• An opportunity to deepen ties to the taxpayer as client and
exclude competitors;
• An opportunity to handle a challenging transaction and to
successfully develop or implement a way to reduce taxes.
These types of temptations can appear in some fashion in any
sophisticated transaction, and pursuing these temptations is not in itself
illegitimate. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the circumstances
when an advisor’s response to those temptations can make an opinion
unreliable.
1. Compensation and Hours Worked
Courts generally have viewed compensation based on a percentage
of tax benefits generated by a transaction as a strong indicator that an
advisor’s opinion is unreliable.244 Also, some courts have viewed high

244. See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1382 (2010) (“J&G’s
role as a promoter of the strategy was . . . apparent in J&G’s fee agreement, which tied the firm’s
compensation to the gain sheltered by the strategy”); Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471,
482 (7th Cir. 2009) (“when an adviser profits considerably from his participation in the tax shelter,
such as where he is compensated through a percentage of the taxes actually sheltered, a taxpayer is
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levels of compensation that are not based on the number of hours
245
The rationale is
worked as indicating that an opinion is unreliable.
that a tax advisor who is being paid a premium for delivering a tax
strategy is more likely to skew the advice in favor of its success.
The fact that a tax advisor charges a premium over rates charged
for other work may be compensation for the tax reduction idea, for other
value that the tax advisor provides (e.g., successfully negotiating a
difficult commercial transaction, advising under very difficult
circumstances, or giving up other profitable opportunities), or because
the tax advisor incurs some risk. Among the risks that a tax advisor
might consider himself to incur are the professional risks of delivering
an opinion that is “at the edge,” or commercial risks such as discounted
arrangements for his work if the transaction is unsuccessful.
If the compensation arrangements indicate that the advisor is
receiving a premium for a tax reduction idea, or for taking the risk of
providing an opinion “at the edge,” further analysis is clearly merited.
The very fact that an advisor is charging a premium based on the tax
reduction offered by the strategy is behavior by the advisor that reflects a
motivation for the premium. The argument for imputing unreliability is
that having shown a desire for the premium, it is reasonable to expect

much less reasonable in relying on any advice the adviser may provide”); Murfam Farms, LLC ex.
rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247 (2010):
[t]he Murphys have conceded that from the beginning they understood that E&Y’s fee
would be a percentage of their desired tax loss. . . In other words, the Murphys
understood that the more taxes they avoided by following E&Y’s advice the more they
would pay E&Y in fees. The Murphys knew that E&Y stood to earn millions by
advising them to participate in COBRA, and they therefore knew or should have known
that E&Y’s advice lacked the trustworthiness of an impartial opinion
New Phoenix Sunrise v.Comm’r, 132 T.C. 161, 194 (2009) (“Petitioner should have . . . known that
Jenkins & Gilchrist had a personal stake in the BLISS transaction and could not be relied upon to
provide independent advice.”).
245. 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 67, 80-81 (2011):
Garza charged a flat fee for implementing [the tax shelter] and wouldn’t have been
compensated at all if Palmlund decided not to go through with it. He wasn’t being paid
to evaluate the deal or tweak a real business deal to increase its tax advantages; he was
being paid to make it happen. And Turner & Stone charged $8,000 for preparing
Palmlund’s tax returns–$6,500 more than usual. The extra fees were not attributable to
an extraordinarily complex return–Palmlund’s returns were always complex due to his
various business interests–but, we find, were the firm’s cut for helping to make the deal
happen
Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199, 221 (2010) (“[w]e also find suspect the exorbitant price tag
associated with the sole condition of closing. Chesapeake essentially bought an insurance policy as
to the taxability of the transaction. PWC received an $800,000 fixed fee for its tax opinion. PWC
did not base its fee on an hourly rate plus expenses.”).
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that the advisor will skew his advice in order to get it.246 However, that
argument confuses the temptation and the resistance—it essentially
assumes that tax professionals are willing to alter their analysis in
response to financial inducement.
One fundamental problem with this position is any professional tax
advisor who is structuring a transaction is being paid for his tax
structuring ideas, regardless of the form of compensation. Even at
hourly rates, a tax advisor is induced to provide advice, and as many
leading tax advisors would be quick to point out, their high hourly rates
are based on the intellectual content (i.e., tax saving ideas) they are able
to provide. As the court in American Boat noted, “one in need of legal
advice almost always has to pay something for it.”247
Because advice cannot be viewed as unreliable merely because an
advisor receives compensation, an approach that treats a specific
compensation formula as suspect must be based on the grounds that the
formula will cause the tax advisor to alter his views. There are two
possible justifications for this position, although neither holds up well to
probing. One possible justification is that an advisor who receives a
premium for a tax idea, rather than charging his regular hourly rate, is
being paid because he is able to deliver an idea that other tax advisors
who are compensated by the hour are unable or unwilling to provide.
The premise is that if other, hourly rate, tax advisors are unable or
unwilling to provide the advice, the tax idea itself must be viewed as
suspect.
The problem with this premise is that the tax profession attracts
intelligent people who sometimes have insights that elude others. One
frequently hears in the profession references to the brilliance of one or
another tax advisor. There will be circumstances where a sophisticated
taxpayer should recognize that the analysis is faulty or “too good to be
true,” but often the taxpayer is not in a position to determine whether the
substantive advice reflects brilliance or wishful thinking. One might
argue that a taxpayer paying a higher than normal price for a tax idea
should obtain a second opinion to verify the idea. However, if the two
advisors disagree, the taxpayer is in no position to determine which
advisor is correct. One might further argue that the taxpayer should
discount the position of the advisor receiving the premium, but that begs
the question.

246. See, e.g., Am. Boat, 583 F.3d at 485 (“[h]ad Mayer required his compensation to be a
percentage of the sheltered capital gains, perhaps our analysis would be different.”).
247. Id. at 483.
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The second possible justification is that a premium payment
implicitly depends on the advisor’s ability to render favorable advice to
the taxpayer. The premium thus creates a temptation to skew the advice.
However, the existence of the temptation itself says nothing about how
the advisor has responded to it. Also, this justification requires two
further assumptions: first, the court must assume that an advisor who
charges hourly rates would be paid the same amount (and would not, for
example, provide a discount) if the advisor were unable to provide
favorable advice. Second, the court must assume that a hypothetical
hourly rate advisor who could not resolve the issue favorably to the
client would command the same hourly rate as a hypothetical hourly rate
advisor who would resolve the issue favorably. It is difficult to imagine
how these assumptions could be tested.
In most cases, courts do not need to rely solely on the fee structure
to establish a conflict of interest, because the advisors take other actions
to enhance their chances of deriving the premium. One obvious example
is where the tax advisor markets the strategy, thereby creating the
opportunity for himself to benefit from providing the tax strategy.
Because the advisor has affirmatively sought out this opportunity, and
persuaded the taxpayer to use the strategy, his behavior clearly was
influenced by the temptation. There should be a very high hurdle to
clear to establish that the advisor reasonably should not be suspected of
also skewing his advice.
Another example is where the tax advisor takes on disproportionate
risks to ensure that the transaction occurs, for example the lawyer in 106
Ltd., who personally promised to cover any taxes, penalties, or litigation
costs of the taxpayer if the transaction blew up.248 A court might find
evidence of such disproportionate risk-taking where an advisor agrees to
be paid only on the closing of the transaction. However, that conclusion
assumes that advisor’s contingent fee arrangement helps ensure that the
transaction occurs, and is not simply motivated by market pressures.
A third example is where the advisor constructs unreal facts or
makes unreal assumptions to support his opinion. The choice to take
those actions clearly indicates both the desire to have the transaction
occur, and the willingness to apply wishful thinking to get there.

248. Under current law, that arrangement would cause the transaction to be a reportable
transaction and under the more stringent rules of I.R.C. § 6664(d), the taxpayer would not be
permitted to rely on the opinion to establish reasonable cause and good faith. See supra note 50.50
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2. Developing, Maintaining, and Protecting a Professional
Practice
In most of the cases discussed above, the tax advisor had prior
involvement with the tax shelter, and presumably had derived fees from
that involvement. Those fees normally would be used to cover the
operating expenses of the practice, including compensating personnel,
and the remainder would be a profit to the owners of the practice. One
can assume that like in any business, there would have been a desire to
maintain or grow the fees of the practice to continue covering expenses
and generating a profit. Also, given the intellectual effort involved in
developing a tax strategy, it is likely that the tax advisor would have
sought to reuse the knowledge and experience gained in prior
249
The tax advisor would have had an interest in reaching
transactions.
similar conclusions to those reached in the prior transactions, in order to
continue his practice of implementing the tax shelter, and to avoid
having to explain any change in position. Finally, the tax advisor would
have an interest in limiting the risk that he or his firm may be held
responsible if the transactions were challenged by the IRS.
Courts generally have not treated an opinion as unreliable merely
because the tax advisor previously advised on a similar product as
opposed, for example, to having developed or marketed the tax shelter.
However, in certain circumstances, courts have considered whether the
tax advisor’s firm prepared and framed its advice in a manner intended
to protect the firm’s reputation and franchise.250 The implication seems
to be that if the tax advisor equivocates, qualifies his advice, or takes
other actions to avoid legal or moral responsibility in the event that the
transaction is challenged by the IRS, the taxpayer should view the advice
as suspect and, presumably, seek advice from another advisor.
In some cases, the behavior of the tax advisor will raise obvious
questions. For example, in Stobie Creek the taxpayers might have asked
249. If the tax advisor requires the taxpayer to maintain the confidentiality of the advisor’s tax
strategies and the advisor’s fee exceeds certain thresholds, the transaction generally will be a
reportable transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3) (as amended in 2003). In that case, the more
stringent rules of I.R.C. § 6664(d) will prevent the taxpayer from relying on the advisor’s opinion to
establish reasonable cause and good faith. In addition, regardless of the amount of fees charged, the
opinion will be subject to the standards of Circular 230 § 10.35 discussed above.
250. See, e.g., Murfam Farms, LLC ex. rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 250-52
(2010) (describing accounting firm’s internal response to an IRS Notice that challenged the relevant
tax shelter, and communications from the accounting firm to the clients regarding such notice);
Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 713 (2008), aff’d 608 F.3d 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (noting lawyer’s attempt to distance himself from his prior recommendation of a tax
shelter transaction).
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whether the law firm had second thoughts about the transaction when it
volunteered to substantially reduce its fee or make an equivalent
251
However, in practice, a taxpayer may have
charitable contribution.
difficulty determining whether disclaimers of legal liability,
qualifications to the advice, or equivocations are a normal part of the
advisor’s practice or reflect an advisor’s lack of confidence in the
opinion. The courts themselves have recognized the fact that in
selecting a tax advisor, a taxpayer may rely largely on the tax advisor’s
market reputation,252 and therefore may have little basis to evaluate the
manner and terms on which the advice is being delivered. More
generally, the uncertain outcome of many tax issues, and the litigious
nature of modern society naturally encourage tax advisors, like other
professional advisors, to seek to protect themselves from legal liability
by qualifying their advice.
3. Cementing Relationships with Clients
In several of the cases, the taxpayer was introduced to the tax
shelter by lawyers or accountants with whom the taxpayer had longstanding relationships. In Stobie Creek and New Phoenix Sunrise, the
lawyers handling a sale of the taxpayer’s business introduced the
taxpayers to the tax shelter promoters. In American Boat, the lawyer
introduced a tax shelter into a business restructuring without the
taxpayer fully understanding the nature of the transaction. Presumably,
the lawyers and accountants in those cases believed that providing good
service to their clients included identifying opportunities to reduce the
clients’ taxes.
These cases demonstrate that a long-standing relationship between
the taxpayer and the tax advisor does not guarantee that the client will
receive reliable advice. As previously discussed, it may be particularly
difficult for a taxpayer that has a long-standing relationship with a tax

251. The unfortunate truth, in that case and in others, is that the taxpayers were more
enthusiastic about the tax shelter than the advisors.
252. See, e.g., Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[t]urning
back to 1996, when the Son of BOSS was still in its infancy and before all of the publicity and legal
trouble, Erwin Mayer was a reputable attorney at Altheimer & Gray”); Stobie Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. at
715 (“[t]he premier legal reputation of SLK is well established . . . Also, prior to the events leading
to its public disgrace and dissolution of the law firm, and during the relevant time period, J&G
enjoyed a vaunted reputation in legal and tax matters”); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United
States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (finding that “Nix and Patterson knew that
Hrdlicka was from one of the premier tax firms in the South.”).
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advisor to ascertain when the tax advisor is proposing inappropriate
strategies for the purpose of expanding the relationship.
Conversely, there is little rationale for treating the opinions of tax
advisors with whom a taxpayer does not have a long-standing
relationship as inherently unreliable. The apparent justification for that
suggestion is that a tax advisor who provides template opinions for tax
shelters will have only a brief relationship with the taxpayer. However,
as discussed above, there are legitimate reasons why a taxpayer may turn
to a new or specialized tax advisor. Therefore, it is doubtful that a tax
advisor’s manifest desire to create or cement relationships with a
taxpayer can itself be a ground for disqualifying an opinion absent a
specific indication that the tax advisor is willing to provide distorted
advice to achieve that goal.
4. Challenging Transactions
Tax advisors providing opinions on tax shelters typically are highly
trained professionals who pride themselves in their ability to maneuver
the rules and principles of the tax law to achieve advantages for their
clients. Given that orientation, tax advisors generally will muster all the
available arguments in favor of tax reduction, and may have a bias
253
A good illustration of this tendency is the
against contrary arguments.
internal memorandum prepared by the SLK tax lawyers that attempted to
distinguish the tax shelter in Stobie Creek from the transactions
described in the IRS notice, and the J&G tax partner’s views (and
apparently those of the J&G opinion committee) along the same lines.
Courts have approached that perceived bias in a number of ways.
One way is to consider the nature of the transaction on which the tax
professional is providing advice. A number of courts and commentators
have suggested that a tax opinion may be less reliable when the
transaction is being undertaken solely for tax purposes.254 Presumably,
the rationale is that where tax reduction is the only goal, and where a

253. See Lawsky, supra note 11, at 1062-63 (noting that experts making forecasts are often
overconfident and identifying factors that may lead to overconfidence).
254. See also Bubel, supra note 11, at 878-79 (“penalty protection was probably never meant
to extend to opinions given on cleverly engineered, structured transactions that would not have been
undertaken at all but for the opinion itself . . . there is a significant difference between a structure in
search of a transaction to effect a legitimate business end and a transaction in search of a willing
structure”); David P. Harriton, Response to “Old ‘Brine’ in New Bottles” (New Brine in Old
Bottles), 55 TAX L. REV. 397, 400 (2002) (“I therefore would limit any definition of ‘tax shelter’
that triggers higher penalties to transactions that, considered as a whole, would not have been
entered into at all but for the desire to claim tax benefits.”). See generally supra note 189.
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transaction cannot be completed without a favorable opinion, a tax
advisor is more likely to skew his estimate of the likelihood that the
position is correct.
There are two problems with this approach. First, there is an
implicit assumption that transactions with an explicit objective of
reducing taxes are more likely to be faulty than transactions where the
transaction has a separate business purpose and the tax planning involves
the manner for effecting the transaction. Although there have been
many faulty tax shelters having tax avoidance as their only objective,
there also are examples of legitimate transactions where the primary
motivation of a participant is reducing taxes, including traditional
leveraged lease transactions and tax credit transactions,255 as well as
more original transactions that have been upheld by the courts.256
Conversely, many highly abusive transactions have been constructed as
real business transactions “done in a ‘funny’ way designed to achieve
tax benefits clearly unintended by Congress.”257
Second, the distinction between a transaction that is undertaken
solely for tax purposes and tax planning connected with a legitimate
business transaction assumes that the tax planning for a legitimate
business transaction is ancillary and that favorable tax advice is not
necessary to complete the transaction. However, as illustrated by the
Canal Corp. case, the tax costs of a legitimate business transaction may
determine its viability, in which case the pressure on a tax advisor in
such a transaction may be as great as in a purely tax motivated
transaction.
A second approach by courts to perceived advisor bias is to
examine the substance of the tax advisor’s opinion. In some cases, the
courts have simply concluded that the results set forth in the tax opinion
are “too good to be true.”258 In other cases, the courts have concluded
255. See, e.g., Harriton, supra note 254, at 402 (safe harbor leases and leveraged leases pass
“legitimate tax benefits that have been conferred by Congress for investment in U.S. business
property from one taxpayer to another”); Schler, supra note 228, at 329 (not all transactions having
a principal purpose of tax avoidance are tax shelters).
256. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) (shifting of
foreign tax credits and generating capital losses); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350
(8th Cir. 2001) (same); United Parcel Serv. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) (generating
deductions for insurance premiums paid to a foreign affiliate).
257. Schler, supra note 228, at 337. See also Eustice, supra note 188, at 168-72 (discussing
“intermediary transactions tax shelter.”).
258. See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
aff’g 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 714-15 (2008):
[b]ased on Jeffrey Welles’s education and experience, as well as the reason the Welleses
pursued the J&G strategy, the trial court found that Jeffrey Welles should have known
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that opinions were unreliable because they failed to address issues or
259
Finally, in some cases the courts have
addressed them inaccurately.

that the J&G strategy was ‘too good to be true.’ . . . In [his role as manager of the
family’s complex finances,] he had helped implement a number of sophisticated taxplanning strategies, giving him sufficient knowledge and experience to know when a tax
planning strategy was likely ‘too good to be true’
Murfam Farms, LLC ex. rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247 (2010) (“[p]ersons of
their background would have known that sheltering nearly the exact amount of capital gains that
they received from the Smithfield merger, in a barely comprehensible, complicated, transaction, in
which there was no real chance of profit, was ‘too good to be true’”); Alpha I, L.P. v. United States,
93 Fed. Cl. 280, 317 (2010) (“[e]ven if the taxpayer relied on advice of professionals, the taxpayer
will still be liable for a negligence penalty if the purported savings are too good to be true”); Jade
Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 56 (2007) (“[t]he spread transaction contributed to
Jade was structured to yield and did yield tax benefits which Bergmann should have recognized as
being ‘too good to be true’”); New Phoenix Sunrise v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 161, 195 (2009):
Jenkens & Gilchrist’s conflict of interest and petitioner’s knowledge of recent
developments in tax law should have convinced petitioner of the need for further
investigation into the proper reporting of the BLISS transaction. Petitioner claimed a
fictional loss of nearly $11 million. This is exactly the type of ‘too good to be true’
transaction that should cause taxpayers to seek out competent advice from independent
advisers
Kerman v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1241 (2011) (“[a]s a capable businessman and prudent
investor, Mr. Kerman knew or should have known that the CARDS transaction was just too good to
be true”); Robucci v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1060:
[e]ven if we were to agree with petitioner that Mr. Carson was not a promoter, we agree
with respondent that the tax result afforded by implementing Mr. Carson’s suggestions,
i.e., the dramatic reduction in Dr. Robucci’s self-employment taxes, was ‘too good to be
true’. . . . [In light of the lack of meaningful activities of the relevant entities], it was
incumbent upon Dr. Robucci, even though he was not a tax professional, to question the
efficacy of the arrangement that purported to minimize his taxes while effecting virtually
no change in the conduct of his medical practice
Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005) (In light of the fact that the
relevant transactions lacked economic substance, “we believe that a reasonable and prudent person
would recognize that these tax losses were ‘too good to be true’, especially given that neither SMP,
Corona, Somerville S Trust, nor Imperial bore the economic loss associated with these tax losses.”).
See also Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[w]hen, as here,
a taxpayer is presented with what would appear to be a fabulous opportunity to avoid tax
obligations, he should recognize that he proceeds at his own peril”); Bubel, supra note 11, at 854-55
(discussing courts’ assessment of a taxpayer’s sophistication in determining whether the taxpayer
relied reasonably and in good faith on a tax advisor’s opinion).
259. See, e.g., Bemont Invs., LLC v. United States, Nos. 4:07cv9, 4:07cv10, 2010 WL
3057437, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010) (“Coscia did little independent research into the question
as to whether the investment vehicle would pass the IRS ‘sniff test.’ Much of his ‘work’ was cut
and paste from prior opinions used by other tax shelter advocates”); Long Term Capital Holdings v.
United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 209-11 (finding tax opinion unreliable in part because legal
analysis on various issues was shallow and general, rather than specific to the facts of the taxpayer’s
transactions, and failed to consider relevant case law); Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199, 220
(2010) (tax opinion could not be relied upon because conclusions were based on reasoning by
analogy and on unsupported conclusions drawn from a regulation); Santa Monica Pictures, 89
T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (finding various tax memoranda and opinions unreliable in part because of
faulty conclusions or incomplete analysis). But see Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States,
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found that contemporaneous IRS announcements calling into question
similar tax strategies placed the taxpayers on notice that the opinion was
260
unreliable.
Each of those approaches implies an obligation on the part of the
taxpayer to question the substantive merits of the tax advisor’s opinion.
Arguably, these approaches can be justified by the per se requirements
in the regulations that the advice be based on all pertinent facts and
circumstances “and the law as it relates to those facts and
circumstances.”261 In effect, if the opinion reaches an incorrect
conclusion, it is not based on the applicable law.
150 Fed. Appx. 40, 43 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005), aff’g 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 210 (D. Conn. 2004)
(concluding that the inadequate legal analysis demonstrated that the opinion was based on “flawed
and outcome-determinative assumptions Long-Term asked it to make.”).
260. See, e.g., Murfam Farms, 94 Fed. Cl. at 249, 251:
Murfam’s supposed naivete regarding COBRA cannot be justified in light of all the other
warning signs that the partners knew or had reason to know about. By the time the tax
returns were filed, there had been numerous unmistakable indications that COBRA was
not legitimate. For example, shortly before the Murphys received and signed their
COBRA engagement letters, the IRS had issued Notice 99-59, warning taxpayers that
artificial losses were not properly allowable. . . . According to Ezzell, he asked pointedly
whether COBRA was subject to this ruling, Slagle replied that it was not, and that
assurance was good enough for Ezzell. . . . Despite his previous background as a
professional tax preparer, Ezzell insists that he did not think it was important to read
Notice 99-59 himself. . . . In fact, Ezzell maintains that to this day he has never seen
Notice 99-59. . . . If it is true that Ezzell never felt the need to read Notice 99-59 and to
make his own determination as to its implications, that is not at all indicative of a good
faith effort to assess one’s proper tax liability. . . . Even after February 2000, glaring
warning signs that COBRA was abusive continued to appear. On August 11, 2000, the
IRS announced and, on August 13, 2000, the IRS released Notice 2000-44
New Phoenix Sunrise, 132 T.C. at 192, 194:
[a]t the time petitioner reported the BLISS transaction on its return, New Phoenix and its
advisers knew that reliance on Helmer was misplaced. New Phoenix filed its return well
after the IRS issued Notice 2000-44, supra, was aware of recent developments in this
area of tax law, and did not seek independent advice to guarantee proper reporting of the
BLISS transaction. . . . At the time New Phoenix and its advisers were considering the
proper reporting of the transaction, Mr. Litt and Mr. Wray were aware that the
Government was investigating transactions similar to the transaction at issue. These
concerns should have put New Phoenix on notice that the reporting of the BLISS
transaction as recommended by Jenkens & Gilchrist was unacceptable
Palm Canyon X Inv. v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009) (“Palm Canyon received ample
warning that respondent was not likely to respect its tax treatment of the MLD transaction. On
September 5, 2000, more than a year before the MLD transaction occurred, the IRS published
Notice 2000-44”); CMA Consol. v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-16 (“given petitioner’s experience
and expertise arranging lease strip deals and its awareness of Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334,
petitioner was aware and forewarned but chose to proceed with the transactions and claim the
deductions.”).
261. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2003). As discussed above, some courts
have rejected opinions containing erroneous or incomplete analysis on the ground that they contain
faulty “legal assumption.” See supra note 204. That characterization appears improper in cases
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The regulations cannot reasonably be read in this way because a
taxpayer will attempt to rely on an opinion to avoid penalties only in
circumstances where the taxpayer has taken an incorrect position on its
tax return.262 A requirement that the opinion contain a complete and
correct legal analysis would be inconsistent with the basic factual
premise that the taxpayer has taken an incorrect position. Because “the
most important factor” in determining whether a taxpayer has acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort
to assess the taxpayer’s proper tax liability,263 omissions or inaccuracies
in the legal analysis should only disqualify an opinion if the taxpayer
knew or reasonably should have known under the circumstances that the
opinion contains faulty legal analysis.264 The opposite conclusion
effectively confuses the role of the disciplinary and malpractice
standards applicable to tax advisors with the role of the reliance
standards applicable to taxpayers.265
Moreover, in determining whether the taxpayer knew or reasonably
should have known that the opinion contains faulty legal analysis, courts
should adhere to the Supreme Court’s dictum in Boyle.266 Provided that
the taxpayer has made the appropriate inquiries under the circumstances,
where an opinion has considered relevant or analogous authorities but reaches an incorrect
conclusion.
262. See Prescott, supra note 8, at 1002 (“[o]bviously, the opinion does not have to be correct
for a taxpayer to reasonably rely on it because the only time a taxpayer needs to show reasonable
reliance is when the IRS or a court has determined that the opinion was incorrect and the IRS has
imposed a penalty on the taxpayer.”).
263. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2003).
264. See Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 150 Fed. Appx. 40, 43 n.1 (2d Cir.
2005), aff’g 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 210 (D. Conn. 2004) (District Court did not “fault Long-Term for
failing to detect legal deficiencies in the tax advice it received from K&S” and did not “[expect]
Long-Term to engage in sophisticated questioning of its expert’s advice”); Prescott, supra note 8, at
1023 (“it appears that, prior to Long Term Capital Holdings, courts did not deny penalty protection
to a taxpayer simply because the quality of the legal advice provided to the taxpayer by a tax expert
was inadequate or wrong.”).
265. But see Bubel, supra note 11, at 873 (arguing that an opinion that fails to address
applicable authorities with sufficient objectivity and in sufficient depth to give the taxpayer a
realistic picture of the tax law treatment of its position would violate the proscription in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii) against unreasonable legal assumptions, and also violate various provisions of
Circular 230 prescribing disciplinary standards for practitioners).
266. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985):
[w]hen an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as
whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice. Most
taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an accountant or
attorney. To require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney, to seek a ‘second opinion,’
or to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very
purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place. . . . ‘Ordinary
business care and prudence’ does not demand such actions.
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and made use of its own knowledge and experience, the taxpayer should
not be imputed tax expertise it does not in fact have. As discussed
above, a typical taxpayer will not be in a position to evaluate the tax
advisor’s legal conclusions, absent a second opinion.267 Even if the
taxpayer were to obtain a second opinion and the two advisors were to
disagree, the taxpayer is in no position to determine which advisor is
correct. As one commentator has noted in respect of the District Court’s
opinion in Long Term Capital Holdings:
[T]he court’s standard would force a taxpayer who desires penalty
protection to become a prognosticating tax expert who can anticipate
whether the court will find his or her attorney’s advice sufficiently well
grounded in the applicable law. Clearly, that standard places too high
a burden on taxpayers and could make tax counsel’s advice practically
useless in the very transactions where penalty protection might be
268
necessary.

On the other hand, the regulations do recognize that the receipt of a
tax opinion meeting the specific regulatory requirements may not be
dispositive if, depending on the circumstances, “the taxpayer claimed tax
benefits that are unreasonable in comparison to the taxpayer’s
269
The emphasis in the regulation to the
investment in the tax shelter.”
relevant facts and circumstances, and the reference in the regulations to
the taxpayer’s “education, sophistication and business experience”270
strongly suggests that the analysis should be framed from the perspective
of the taxpayer. In other words, the question is whether the specific
taxpayer should have known that the purported tax benefits are
implausible, and the taxpayer’s efforts to test any doubts.
It follows from the foregoing that a court should not reject a
taxpayer’s reliance on a tax opinion merely because the court finds the
tax benefits stated in the opinion to be objectively implausible, or
because the tax benefits are inconsistent with IRS pronouncements.
Rather, the first should consider whether the specific taxpayer under the
relevant facts and circumstances should have had reason to doubt the
plausibility of the tax benefits, either because they were outsized, or

267. See NPR Invs., LLC v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 2d 676, 693 (2010) (“[a]s aptly stated
by Mr. Nix at trial, ‘at every step, we followed the advice of people we relied on, people who were
supposed to have known what they were doing and did know what they were doing. And what else
could we have done except follow their advice?’”). As discussed above, in the specific facts of that
case the taxpayer’s protestations do not come across as being particularly sincere.
268. See Prescott, supra note 8, at 126 (footnote omitted).
269. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(3) (as amended in 2003).
270. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).
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because the taxpayer knew or should have known of the IRS’ position
and its relationship to the taxpayer’s transaction. The implausibility of a
tax advantage in the eyes of a court may be less obvious to a taxpayer,
even one with substantial business or investment experience.
To the extent that the taxpayer should have questioned the
purported tax benefits, the court next should consider the taxpayer’s
attempts to test its doubts and particularly the taxpayer’s interaction with
the tax advisor. For example, it may be sufficient if the taxpayer raises
its concerns with the tax advisor who assures the taxpayer that the
purported advantages are available, that the advisor has considered and
properly addressed all relevant issues, and that the advisor has addressed
any contrary IRS pronouncement.
Such assurances should not
themselves be treated per se as unreliable, because as a number of courts
have noted in this context, legitimate structures exist that provide
outsized tax benefits,271 and courts are not bound to follow every IRS
announcement.272
271. See, e.g., Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 485 (7th Cir. 2009):
the government points to the substantial tax benefit that Jump received as a result of the
short-sale transactions, claiming that such a ‘too good to be true’ transaction should have
put him on notice that something was awry. There is no doubt that the benefit Jump
received was large, and this is the argument that gets the government the nearest to
undermining Jump’s assertion that he had reasonable cause. But, in general, ‘it is
axiomatic that taxpayers lawfully may arrange their affairs to keep taxes as low as
possible’
Southgate Master Fund, LLC v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 596, 667 (N.D. Tex. 2009):
the Government argues the tax results of Southgate were simply ‘too good to be true’
and that Plaintiff displayed head-in-the-sand negligence. Plaintiff responds that through
careful reading of the Internal Revenue Code and reliance upon tax and legal
professionals, it determined that the interaction of Code sections could plausibly create
tax losses that exceeded cash losses. As Professor Weisbach verified, citing Crane v.
Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), and Comm’r v. Tufts, 460 U.S. 300 (1983), a scenario in
which the tax losses exceed the cash contributions to the transaction does not necessarily
render a transaction illegitimate. Weisbach noted that many transactions–as when a
company acquires a bank with distressed loans, like the Wells Fargo acquisition of
Wachovia in 2008–produce tax losses in excess of economic losses
Allison v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 568, 596 (“there is no per se rule that tax benefits of a certain
size are presumed impossible.”). Cf. Stobie Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 358
(2008) (upholding objection to offer of an expert report that, among other things, “recounts the
history of aggressive tax planning as a legitimate approach to minimizing taxes and . . . surveys
cases in which courts have upheld taxpayers’ aggressive tax planning strategies . . . examin[ing]
cases in which taxpayers prevailed even where a situation was ‘too good to be true,’ and where the
IRS prevailed even where a situation was ‘too bad to be true.’”).
272. See Ryan Lirette, Giving Chevron Deference to Revenue Rulings and Procedures, 129
TAX NOTES 1357 (2010); Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239 (2009); Ryan C. Morris, Comment, Substantially
Deferring to Revenue Rulings After Mead, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 999 (2005); American Bar Ass’n
Section of Taxation, Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717 (2004);
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V. CONCLUSION
Taxpayers normally should not be permitted to rely on the opinions
of tax advisors who are tax shelter promoters, brokers of tax shelters, or
have referral arrangements with promoters. To allow reliance on
opinions that are rendered by persons who are clearly motivated to
overstate the merits of a tax structure would undermine the purpose of
the penalty regimes and ultimately the tax system as a whole. However,
courts should not deny a taxpayer the ability to rely on an opinion
merely because the tax advisor delivers the opinion in circumstances that
create apparent temptations, for example because the tax advisor has
developed or implemented a tax reduction strategy that ultimately proves
ineffective. Such an approach is intellectually flawed because it
confuses the temptation to distort with the distortion itself. Also, such
an approach risks imposing unwarranted penalties on taxpayers who turn
to tax advisors to guide them in legitimately reducing their taxes.
Rather, in determining whether the taxpayer acted reasonably in relying
on a tax opinion, courts should consider the nature of the apparent
temptations faced by the tax advisor and the advisor’s apparent
resistance to those temptations, as they affect the taxpayer’s efforts to
assess its proper tax liability.
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